or a usurped one, she is entitled to its value. This is the opinion of Abu Yusuf and al-Shafi'i in his earlier (qadim) view. In his later (jadid) view, he said she is entitled to the dowry of a similar woman (mahr al-mithl). Abu Hanifa and Muhammad said regarding the usurped one what we said, but regarding the free man, they said what he [al-Shafi'i] said; because the contract was attached to the essence of the free man by his pointing to him, so it is similar to if they both knew him to be free. Our evidence is that the contract was based on the designation, so she is entitled to its value, just as with the usurped one. Furthermore, she was satisfied with its value because she thought it was owned property, so she is entitled to its value, just as if she found it defective and returned it, unlike the case where he says: "I give you this free man as a dowry, or this usurped item." In that case, she was satisfied with nothing, due to her acceptance of something she knows is not property, or something he is not capable of giving her in ownership, so the existence of the naming is like its absence, and she is entitled to the mahr al-mithl. As for the statement of al-Khiraqi: "Whether he delivered it to her or did not deliver it," he means that his delivering it does not avail anything, because he delivered what is not permissible to deliver, and possession cannot be established over it, so its existence is like its absence.

Section: If he assigns a fungible item as a dowry and it turns out to be usurped, she is entitled to its equivalent, because the equivalent is closer to it; this is why one provides a guarantee with it in cases of destruction. If he assigns her a jar of vinegar as a dowry and it turns out to be wine or usurped, she is entitled to an equivalent of that in vinegar, because vinegar is among those things having equivalents. This is the school of Abu Hanifa and some of al-Shafi'i's companions. Al-Qadi said: She is entitled to its value, because wine is not property, nor is it among those things having equivalents. The correct view is what we have stated, because he named it vinegar, and she was satisfied with it on that basis; therefore, she is entitled to the replacement of the named item, just like the free man. What he mentioned is invalidated by the case where he assigns a slave as a dowry and he turns out to be a free man. Furthermore, if he obligates the value of wine, wine has no value, and if he obligates the value of vinegar, he has then considered the naming in obligating its value, so in obligating its equivalent, it is even more appropriate.

Section: If he says: "I give you this wine as a dowry," while pointing to vinegar, or "this slave of so-and-so," while pointing to his own slave, the naming is valid, and she is entitled to the item pointed to, because the contract on the object is valid, and its legal ruling does not change with the difference in its description, just as if he said: "I sell you this black slave," while pointing to a white one, or "this tall one," while pointing to a short one.