Section: Appointment of an agent is valid in Khul' (divorce initiated by the wife in exchange for compensation) by either of the spouses, or by one of them alone. Anyone whose acting on their own behalf in Khul' is valid may also act as an agent or appoint an agent, whether they are free or a slave, male or female, Muslim or non-Muslim, under interdiction (mahjur 'alayh) or of sound judgment (rashid), because each one of them is permitted to obligate Khul', so it is valid for them to be an agent and a principal in it, just like a free person of sound judgment. This is the school of Al-Shafi'i and the scholars of opinion (Ashab al-Ra'y), and I know of no disagreement regarding it.

The agency of the woman concerns three things: requesting Khul' or divorce, specifying the compensation, and delivering it. The agency of the man concerns three things: stipulating the compensation, taking possession of it, and effecting the divorce or Khul'. It is permissible to appoint an agent with the compensation specified or without specification, because it is a contract of exchange, so it is valid in this manner, like a sale or marriage. It is recommended to specify it, as it is safer from uncertainty (gharar) and easier for the agent, as it frees them from the need for independent judgment (ijtihad).

If the husband appoints an agent, there are two situations. The first is that he specifies the compensation for him; if he performs Khul' with that [amount] or more, it is valid, and the specified amount becomes binding because he acted according to what he was ordered. If he performs Khul' for less than that, there are two views: one is that the Khul' is invalid. This is the choice of Ibn Hamid and the school of Al-Shafi'i, because he contradicted his principal, so his act is not valid, just as if he had appointed him to perform Khul' on one woman and he performed it on another; and because he did not authorize him to perform Khul' for this compensation, it is not valid from him, like a stranger. The second view is that it is valid, and he has recourse against the agent for the deficiency. This is the view of Abu Bakr, because contradiction in the amount of compensation does not invalidate the Khul', as in the case of general authorization, though the first view is more appropriate.

As for contradicting the genus (category), such as if he orders him to perform Khul' for dirhams and he performs it for a slave, or vice versa, or orders him to perform Khul' immediately (hal) and he performs it for delayed compensation (nasi'ah), the analogy (qiyas) is that it is invalid, because he contradicted his principal in the genus of the compensation, so his act is not valid, like an agent in a sale. Furthermore, what he performed the Khul' for is not owned by the principal, because he did not authorize it, nor by the agent, because he did not originate the cause in relation to himself. This differs from contradicting the amount, because it is possible to rectify that by having recourse against the agent for the deficiency. The Qadi said: The analogy is that the agent is liable for the amount he was authorized for, and he receives what he performed the Khul' with, by analogy to contradicting the amount; however, this is invalidated by the case of an agent in a sale, and because this is a Khul' that the husband did not authorize, so it is not valid, just as if he had not appointed him for anything, and because it leads to him owning compensation that the woman did not make him own, nor did he intend to own it, and the woman becomes divorced from her husband without compensation that she was bound to give him without his permission. As for contradiction in the amount, that does not necessarily follow, although the correct view is that the Khul' is also invalid in that case, for the reasons we have presented. The second situation is if he leaves the agency general (unspecified), then it implies Khul' for her specified dower to be paid immediately in the currency of the land. If he performs Khul' for that or more, it is valid because he gave him better. If he performs it for less, there are the two views mentioned regarding when he specifies the compensation and performs it for less. The Qadi mentioned two other possibilities: one is that the specified amount drops and the dower of similar worth becomes due, because he performed Khul' for something he was not authorized to perform it with. The second is that the husband has the choice between accepting the deficient compensation without having the right of revocation, or rejecting it, in which case he has the right of revocation. If he performs Khul' with something other than the currency of the land, its ruling is the same as if he had specified compensation for him but performed it with a different genus. If the agent performs Khul' with something that is not property, such as wine or swine, the Khul' is not valid and the divorce does not take effect, because he was not authorized to do so; he was only authorized to perform Khul', which is the separation of the woman for compensation, and what he brought about is a divorce he was not authorized to perform. The Qadi mentioned this in 'Al-Mujarrad', and it is the school of Al-Shafi'i, regardless of whether he specified the compensation or left it general. In 'Al-Jami'', he mentioned that the Khul' is valid and he has recourse against the agent for the specified amount, and the woman owes nothing. This is if we say that Khul' without compensation is not valid. If we say it is not valid, it is only valid if it is in the wording of divorce, in which case it takes effect as a revocable divorce. He argued that if the wife's agent performed Khul' with that, it would be valid, so the husband's agent is the same. This analogy is incorrect, for the husband's agent effects the divorce, so it is not valid for him to effect it upon something he was not authorized, whereas the wife's agent does not effect it; he only accepts. Furthermore, when the husband's agent performs Khul' for a forbidden thing, he causes his principal to lose the compensation, whereas the wife's agent saves her from it; thus, validity in a case where he saves his principal from the obligation of compensation does not necessitate validity in a case where he causes him to lose it. Does one not see that...