you enter the house,' and he says: 'I intended a month.' It is accepted from him. Or he says: 'If you enter the house of so-and-so, you are divorced,' and he intended that specific hour or that specific day, his intention is accepted. The other narration is that it is not accepted; for he said: 'If he says to his wife: "You are divorced," and he intended in his soul a period of a year, she is divorced.' No consideration is given to his intention. He [Ibn Qudama] also said: 'If he says: "You are divorced," and says: "I intended: if you enter the house," it is not believed.' It is possible to reconcile these two narrations by interpreting his statement regarding acceptance to mean that he is believed between him and Allah Almighty, and his statement regarding non-acceptance to mean in terms of legal judgment; thus, there is no contradiction between them. The difference between this case and the one before it is that intending the specific via the general is common and frequent, while intending a condition without mentioning it is not permissible; it is close to an exception (istithna'). It is possible to say: this whole matter is part of the classification of specification.
Section: If one of his wives says to him: 'Divorce me,' and he says: 'My wives are divorced,' and he has no intention, all of them are divorced without disagreement; because his wording is general. If she says to him: 'Divorce your wives,' and he says: 'My wives are divorced,' it is the same. It is narrated from Malik that the one who asked for the divorce is not divorced in this case; because the general address is restricted to its specific cause, and its cause is the request for the divorce of someone other than her. Our position is that the wording is general regarding her, and it was not intended to be anything other than its implication, so it is necessary to act upon its generality, like the first case. Acting upon the generality of the wording is more appropriate than the specificity of the cause; because the evidence for the ruling is the wording, so it must be followed, and it is necessary to act upon its implication in its specificity and its generality. Therefore, if it were more specific than the cause, it would be necessary to restrict it to its specificity, and follow the quality of the wording rather than the quality of the cause. If he excluded the one who asked [the question] by his intention, he is believed between him and Allah Almighty in both cases, and it is accepted in legal judgment in the second case; because the specificity of the cause is evidence of his intention. It was not accepted in the first case, as Ibn Hamid said; because his divorce is a response to her request for divorce for herself, so he is not believed in diverting it away from her; because that contradicts the apparent meaning in two respects, and because she is the cause of the divorce, and the cause of a ruling cannot be excluded
(4) In the original: "al-sa'il" (the questioner).
تَدخُلُ الدَّارَ، وقال: نوَيْتُ شهرًا. يُقْبَلُ منه. أو قال: إِذا دخَلْتِ دارَ فلانٍ فأنتِ طالقٌ. وَنوَى تلك السَّاعةَ، وذلك اليومَ. قُبِلَتْ نِيَّتُه. والرِّوايةُ الأُخرى، لا تُقبَلُ؛ فإنَّه قال: إذا قال لامرأتِه: أنتِ طالقٌ. وَنوَى فى نفسِه إلى سَنَةٍ، تَطْلُقُ. ليس يُنْظَرُ إلى نِيَّتِه. وقال: إذا قال: أنتِ طالقٌ. وقال: نَوَيْتُ إن دخَلْتِ الدَّارَ. لا يُصَدَّقُ. ويُمْكِنُ الجَمعُ بين هاتَيْنِ الرِّوايتَيْنِ، بأن يُحْبَكَ قولُه فى القَبُولِ، على أنَّه يَدِينُ فيما بينَه وبينَ اللَّهِ تعالى، وقولُه فى عدمِ القبولِ، على الحُكمِ، فلا يكونُ بينهما اخْتلافٌ، والفَرْقُ بينَ هذه الصُّورةِ والتى قبلَها، أن ارادةَ الخاصِّ بالعامِّ شائعٌ كثيرٌ، وإرادةَ الشَّرطِ من غيرِ ذكرِه غيرُ سائغٍ، فهو قريبٌ مِنَ الاسْتِثْناءِ. ويُمْكِنُ أن يُقالَ: هذا كلُّه مِن جُملةِ التَّخْصيصِ.
فصل: وإذا قالتْ له امرأةٌ من نِسائِه: طَلِّقْنِى. فقال: نِسائِى طَوالقُ. ولا نِيَّةَ له، طَلُقْنَ كُلُّهنَّ. بغيرِ خلافٍ؛ لأنَّ لَفْظَه عامٌّ. وإِن قالتْ له: طلِّقْ نساءَك. فقال: نسائِى طَوالقُ. فكذلك. وحُكِىَ عن مالكٍ، أَنَّ السَّائلةَ لا تَطْلُقُ فى هذه الصُّورةِ؛ لأنَّ الخطابَ العامَّ يُقْصَرُ على سَببِه الخاصِّ، وسببُه سؤالُ طَلاقِ مَنْ سِوَاها. ولَنا، أَنَّ اللَّفظَ عامٌّ فيها، ولم يُرَدْ به غيرُ مُقْتَضاه، فوجَبَ العملُ بعُمومِه، كالصُّورةِ الأُولى، والعملُ بعُمومِ اللَّفظِ أوْلَى مِن خُصوص السَّببِ؛ لأنَّ دليلَ الحُكْمِ هو اللَّفظُ، فيَجِبُ اتِّباعُه، والعملُ بمُقْتضاه فى خُصوصِه وعُمومِه، ولذلك لو كان أخَصَّ مِنَ السَّببِ، لَوجبَ قصرُه على خُصوصِه، واتباعُ صفةِ اللَّفظِ دونَ صفةِ السَّببِ، فإن أخرجَ السَّائلةَ (٤) بنِيَّتِه، دِينَ فيما بينَه وبينَ اللَّهِ تعالى فى الصُّورتينِ، وقُبِلَ فى الحُكْمِ فى الصُّورةِ الثَّانيةِ؛ لأنَّ خُصوصَ السَّببِ دليلٌ على نِيَّتِه، ولم يُقبَلْ فى الصُّورةِ الأُولى. قالَه ابنُ حامدٍ؛ لأنَّ طلاقَه جَوابٌ لسُؤالِها الطَّلاقَ لنفسِها، فلا يُصَدَّقُ فى صَرْفِه عنها؛ لأنَّه يُخالِفُ الظَّاهرَ من وَجْهيْنِ، ولأنَّها سببُ الطَّلاقِ، وسببُ الحُكْمِ لا يَجوزُ إخْراجُه
(٤) فى الأصل: "السائل".