And you are heedless of him" (66). This is frequent, so it is not permissible to sever it from the speech which is in its context when it is possible to connect it to it. If he said: "If you speak to Zayd and Muhammad is with Khalid, you are divorced," she is not divorced until she speaks to Zayd while Muhammad is with Khalid; likewise if his statement "Muhammad is with Khalid" is delayed. If he said: "You are divorced if you speak to Zayd while I am absent," she is not divorced until she speaks to him while he is absent. The same applies if he said: "You are divorced if you speak to Zayd while you are riding," or "while he is riding," or "and Muhammad is riding," she is not divorced until she speaks to him in that state. If he said: "You are divorced if you speak to Zayd and his brother Muhammad is ill," she is not divorced until she speaks to him while his brother Muhammad is ill.
Section: If he said: "If you speak to me (68) until Zayd arrives, or until Zayd arrives, you are divorced," and she speaks to him before his arrival, he commits a breach; because he extended the prohibition to a terminus which is the arrival of Zayd, so he does not commit a breach after it. If he said: "I intended, if you continue my speech from now until Zayd arrives," he is believed. As for whether this is accepted in legal judgment, there are two possibilities.
Section: If he said: "You are divorced if you wish," or "whenever you wish," or "when you wish," or "every time you wish," or "however you wish," or "wherever you wish," or "whenever you wish," she is not divorced until she wishes and utters the wish with her tongue, by saying: "I have wished." Because what is in the heart is not known until the tongue expresses it, so the ruling is suspended upon what is uttered (69), not what is in the heart. If she wished in her heart without her utterance, no divorce takes place, and if she said: "I have wished" with her tongue while she was averse, the divorce occurs, in consideration of the utterance. The same applies if he suspended the divorce on the wish of someone else. Whenever the wish is found by the tongue, the divorce occurs, whether it is immediate or delayed. Ahmad stipulated this regarding suspending...
(66) Sūrat Yūsuf 13. (67) In the original and M: "law" (if). (68) In A, B, and M: "kallamtanī" (you spoke to me). (69) In M: "yataʿallaqu" (it relates).
الذِّئْبُ وَأَنْتُمْ عَنْهُ غَافِلُونَ} (٦٦). وهذا كثيرٌ، فلا يَجُوزُ قَطْعُه عن الكلامِ الذى هو فى سِيَاقِه مع إمْكانِ وَصْلِه به، ولو قال: إن كلَّمتِ زيدًا ومحمّدٌ مع خالدٍ فأنتِ طالقٌ. لم تَطْلُقْ حتى تُكَلِّمَ زيدًا فى حالِ كونِ محمدٍ مع خالدٍ، فكذلك إذا تَأخَّرَ قوله: محمد مع خالدٍ. ولو قال: أنتِ طالقٌ إن (٦٧) كلَّمتِ زيدًا وأنا غائبٌ، لم تَطْلُقْ حتى تُكلِّمَه فى حالِ غَيْبتِه. وكذلك لو قال: أنتِ طالقٌ إن كلَّمتِ زيدًا وأنتِ راكبةٌ. أو وهو راكبٌ. أو: ومحمدٌ راكبٌ. لم تَطْلُقْ حتى تُكلِّمَه فى تلكِ الحالِ. ولو قال: أنتِ طالقٌ إن كلَّمْتِ زيدًا ومحمدٌ أخوه مريضٌ. لم تَطْلُقْ حتى تُكلِّمَه وأخوه محمدٌ مريضٌ.
فصل: فإن قال: إن كلَّمْتِينِى (٦٨) إلى أن يَقْدَمَ زيدٌ. أو: حتى يَقْدَمَ زيدٌ، فأنتِ طالقٌ. فكلَّمَتْه قبلَ قُدُومِه، حَنِثَ؛ لأنَّه مَدَّ المَنْعَ إلى غايةٍ هى قُدُومُ زيدٍ، فلا يَحْنَثُ بعدَها. فإن قال: أردتُ إن اسْتَدَمْتِ كلامِى مِن الآن إلى أن يَقْدَمَ زيدٌ. دِينَ. وهل يُقبَلُ فى الحُكمِ؟ يَحْتمِلُ وَجْهَيْنِ.
فصل: فإن قال: أنتِ طالقٌ إنْ شئتِ. أو: وإذا شئتِ. أو: متى شِئتِ. أو: كلَّما شئتِ. أو: كيف شئتِ. أو: حيث شئتِ. أو: أنَّى شئتِ. لم تَطْلُقْ حتى تشاءَ، وتَنطِقَ بالمشيئةِ بلسانِها، فتقولَ: قد شئتُ. لأنَّ ما فى القلبِ لا يُعْلَمُ حتى يُعبِّرَ عنه اللِّسانُ، فتَعَلَّقَ الحُكْمُ بما ينْطِقُ (٦٩) به، دونَ ما فى القلبِ، فلو شاءت بقلبِها دونَ نُطْقِها، لم يَقَعْ طلاقٌ، ولو قالت: قد شِئْتُ. بلسانِها وهى كارهةٌ، لَوقعَ الطَّلاقُ، اعتبارًا بالنُّطِق. وكذلك إن علَّقَ الطَّلاقَ بمَشِيئةِ غيرِها. ومتى وُجِدَتِ المَشيئةُ باللِّسانِ، وقعَ الطَّلاقُ، سَواءٌ كان على الفَوْرِ أو التَّراخِى. نصَّ عليه أحمدُ، فى تَعْليقِ
(٦٦) سورة يوسف ١٣.(٦٧) فى الأصل، م: "لو".(٦٨) فى أ، ب، م: "كلمتنى".(٦٩) فى م: "يتعلق".