And she denied it. The judge said: "His statement is accepted," for the reasons we have mentioned. This is one of the views of the followers of al-Shafi'i. The apparent meaning of al-Khiraqi's words is that her statement is accepted, whether he preceded her with the claim or she preceded him, which is a second view of the followers of al-Shafi'i, because the outward state is final separation (baynuna), and the original principle is the absence of revocation; thus, the outward appearance is with her. Furthermore, whoever's statement is accepted when they are first to speak is also accepted when they are second, like everyone whose statement is accepted. They have a third view: that the statement is the husband's in all cases, because the woman is claiming that which terminates the marriage, and he denies it, so the statement is his, just as if the one who took an oath of continence (muli) or the impotent man (annin) claims to have had intercourse with his wife and she denies it. This is not correct, for the cause of final separation has already been established, and he is moving toward it unless that which lifts it and removes its ruling is found, and the original principle is its absence; therefore, the statement is [the statement of] the one who denies it, unlike the case they compared it to. If the statement occurred from both of them simultaneously, then there is no revocation, because her report regarding the expiration of her waiting period occurs after it, so his statement is after the waiting period and thus is not accepted. Abu al-Khattab said: "It is possible that lots be drawn between them, and the statement is that of the one for whom the lot falls." The correct view is the first.

Section: If they disagree regarding intercourse, he says: "I have had intercourse with you, so I have the right to revoke you," and she denies it, or she says: "He has had intercourse with me, so I am entitled to the full dowry," the statement is that of the one among them who denies, because the original principle is with them, and it is not removed except by certainty. He does not have the right to revoke her in either case, because he denies the intercourse, and he is effectively admitting to the final separation and that he has no right to revoke her. If she denies it, her statement is accepted, and she is not entitled to more than half the dowry in both cases; [because if she denies it, she is acknowledging that she is not entitled to more than half the dowry] (28), and if he denies it, the statement is his. This is if it is [a dowry that is] not (29) received; if their disagreement is after she has received it, and he claims to have had intercourse with her and she denies it, he cannot reclaim anything from her, because he admits it is hers and does not claim otherwise. If he is the one who denies it, he reclaims half of it from her. This is the position of al-Shafi'i and the scholars of opinion (ashab al-ra'y). If it is said: "Why then did you accept the statement of the one who took an oath of continence and the impotent man regarding intercourse, and did not accept it here?" We say: Because the one who took an oath of continence and the impotent man claim that which maintains the validity of the marriage and prevents its annulment, and the original principle is the validity of the contract and its soundness, so their statements were in accordance with the original principle and were accepted. In our issue, that which terminates the marriage and removes it has occurred, which is what leads to final separation, and they have disagreed over that which lifts the ruling of divorce and establishes for him the right of revocation, and the original principle is the absence of that, so his statement is contrary to the original principle and is not accepted. Furthermore, the one who took an oath of continence and the impotent man claim intercourse in a situation where seclusion and the opportunity for intercourse were established; for if that were not present, they would not be entitled to annulment due to the lack of intercourse, so the disagreement pertains to something specific to them. In our issue, neither seclusion nor opportunity was established, for if that were established, the full dowry would have become mandatory; thus, the disagreement is regarding a manifest matter not specific to him, so the statement of its claimant is not accepted without evidence. Whether an oath is legislated in the right of the person whose statement is accepted here is a matter of two views.

Section: Seclusion is like intercourse in establishing the right of revocation for the husband over the woman with whom he has secluded himself, according to the manifest opinion of al-Khiraqi, due to his statement: "Its ruling is the ruling of consummation in all its aspects." This is the view of al-Shafi'i in the old (qadim) school. Abu Bakr said: "He has no right of revocation over her unless he has had intercourse with her," and this is also the view of al-Nu'man, his two companions, and al-Shafi'i in the new (jadid) school, because she has not been consummated, so she is not entitled to have her revocation [pursued], just like the one with whom he did not seclude himself. Our evidence is the saying of the Almighty: "And divorced women shall wait for three menstrual cycles, and it is not lawful for them to conceal what Allah has created in their wombs," up to His saying: "And their husbands have the better right to take them back in that period." Furthermore, she is a woman observing a waiting period from a divorce for which there was no compensation, and she has not exhausted its number, so the right of revocation is established over her, just like the one who was consummated. Moreover, she is a woman in a waiting period whom his divorce can reach, so he possesses the right to revoke her, like the one he had intercourse with. This is distinct from the one he did not seclude himself with, for she is irrevocably separated from him, has no waiting period, and his divorce cannot reach her; rather, revocation is only for the woman in a waiting period whom his divorce can reach.

Section: If the husband of a slave woman claims after her waiting period that he had revoked her during her waiting period (33), and she called him a liar.