This is the opinion of Al-Hasan, Al-Sha'bi, Al-Dahhak, Ishaq, and the People of Opinion (Ashab al-Ra'y). It is also one of the opinions of Al-Shafi'i. The second opinion is that she completes the 'idda of a slave woman, whether she was ba'in (irrevocably divorced) or raj'i (revocably divorced). This is the opinion of Malik and Abu Thawr; because freedom supervened after the 'idda became incumbent upon her, so its ruling is not taken into consideration, just as if she were irrevocably divorced, or as if it [freedom] supervened after the obligation of istibra' (establishing the emptiness of the womb). Furthermore, because this is an issue that varies based on servitude and freedom, the consideration is given to the state at the time of obligation, like the fixed legal punishment (hadd).

Ata', Al-Zuhri, and Qatada said: She builds upon the 'idda of a free woman in every case. This is the third opinion of Al-Shafi'i; because the cause for the full 'idda, when it is found during the 'idda, causes her to transition to it even if she is irrevocably divorced, just as if she observed the 'idda by months and then saw blood.

We say: That if she is emancipated while she is in a revocable divorce, freedom has been found while she is a wife who would observe the 'idda of death if he were to die, so it becomes incumbent upon her to observe the 'idda of free women, just as if she were emancipated before the divorce. If she is emancipated while she is irrevocably divorced, then freedom was not found during the state of marriage, so the 'idda of free women does not become incumbent upon her, just as if she were emancipated after two menstrual cycles had passed. Furthermore, the woman in a revocable divorce transitions to the 'idda of death if he dies, so she transitions to the 'idda of free women, whereas the irrevocably divorced woman does not transition to the 'idda of death, so she does not transition to the 'idda of free women, just as if her 'idda had expired.

What we mentioned for Malik is invalidated by the case where the husband of a woman in a revocable divorce dies, for she transitions to the 'idda of death. The difference between what we are discussing and the case where the young girl menstruates is that the months are a substitute for the menstrual cycles, and when the original is found, the ruling of the substitute ceases, like the one performing tayammum who finds water. This is not the case here, for the 'idda of a slave woman is not a substitute; that is why the slave woman builds upon what has passed of her 'idda by consensus. If the young girl menstruates, she restarts the 'idda, so they are distinct. It also differs from istibra'; for if freedom were to coincide with the cause of its obligation, it [the 'idda] would not be completed. Do you not see that if the mother of a child (umm al-walad) has her master die, she is emancipated due to his death, and istibra' becomes incumbent just as it is incumbent upon one who was not emancipated? Moreover, istibra' does not vary with servitude or freedom, unlike our issue.