an oath; for it is an oath of obstinacy (lajjaj) and anger; this is its ruling. If he hangs the three divorces (talaq) upon having intercourse with her, he is not ordered to perform fay'ah (return to the wife), but rather is ordered to divorce; because intercourse is not possible, as she becomes irrevocably divorced from him upon the insertion of the glans (hashafah), and he would thus be deriving pleasure from a stranger. This is the opinion of some of the followers of al-Shafi'i. Most of them said: Fay'ah is permissible, because withdrawing is a cessation of intercourse, and cessation of intercourse is not intercourse. The Qadi mentioned that the speech of Ahmad implies two narrations, like these two views. The one more befitting the school of Ahmad is its prohibition, for three reasons: First, the end of the intercourse occurs with a stranger as we have mentioned, for withdrawal is enjoyed just as insertion is enjoyed, so it is in the ruling of intercourse. For this reason, we said regarding someone whom dawn overtakes while he is having intercourse, and then he withdraws: that he breaks his fast. Prohibition here is more appropriate, because the breaking of the fast is by intercourse. It is possible to prevent the view that withdrawal is intercourse, yet the prohibited act here is seeking pleasure, and withdrawal is a form of seeking pleasure, so it is prohibited. Furthermore, touching her for the purpose of deriving pleasure is prohibited, so touching the private part with the private part is more entitled to be prohibited. If it is said: This only occurs due to the necessity of ceasing the prohibited intercourse, we say: If intercourse is not possible except by performing a prohibited act, it is prohibited by the necessity of avoiding the prohibited. Just as if pork were mixed with permissible meat, and he could not eat it except by eating pork, it would be prohibited. And if carrion became confused with lawfully slaughtered meat, or his wife with a stranger, all would be prohibited. The second reason: Through intercourse, the divorce occurs after the act, and it is a bid'ah (innovative) divorce. Just as it is prohibited to execute it with his tongue, it is prohibited to fulfill its cause. Third, that (7) a bid'ah divorce occurs through it from another aspect, which is the combining (8) of the three. If he has intercourse, he must withdraw as soon (9) as he inserts the glans, and not exceed that, nor remain, nor move during the withdrawal, because she is a stranger. If he does that, there is no hadd (prescribed penalty) and no dower (mahr), because he is a person ceasing intercourse. If he remains or completes the insertion, there is no hadd upon him, due to the presence of the uncertainty (shubhah), because it is an act of intercourse that is partially with his wife. Regarding the dower, there are two views: One is that it is incumbent upon him, because he performed a prohibited act of intercourse in a place that is not owned, so it mandates the dower, just as if he inserted after withdrawal. The second is:
(7) In A and B and M: "that". (8) In A: "by combining". (9) In B: "until".
يمينٍ؛ لِأنَّه نَذْرُ لَجاجٍ وغَضَبٍ، فهذا حُكْمُه. وإن عَلَّقَ طلاقَها الثَّلاثَ بِوَطْئِها، لم يُؤْمَرْ بالفَيْئَةِ، وأُمِرَ بالطَّلاقِ؛ لأنَّ الوطءَ غيرُ مُمْكِنٍ؛ لِكَوْنها تَبِينُ منه بإيلَاجِ الحَشَفَةِ، فيصيرُ مُسْتَمْتِعًا بأجْنَبِيَّةٍ. وهذا قولُ بعضِ أصحابِ الشَّافِعِىِّ. وأكثرُهم قالوا: تجوزُ الفَيْئَةُ؛ لأنَّ النَّزْعَ تَرْكٌ للوطءِ، وتَرْكُ الوَطْءِ ليس بوَطْءٍ. وقد ذَكَرَ القاضى أَنَّ كلامَ أحمدَ يقْتَضِى روايَتَيْنِ، كهذَيْنِ الوَجْهَيْنِ. واللائِقُ بمذهبِ أحمدَ تَحْرِيمُه؛ لوجوهٍ ثَلاثةٍ، أحدُها أنّ آخِرَ الوَطْءِ حَصَلَ فى أجنبيةٍ كما ذكرْنا؛ فإنَّ النَّزْعَ يُلْتَذُّ به كما يُلْتَذُّ بالإِيلاجِ، فيكونُ فى حُكْمِ الوَطْءِ، ولذلك قُلْنا فى مَن طَلَعَ عليه الفجرُ وهو مُجامِعٌ، فنزَع: أنَّه يُفْطِرُ. والتَّحْريمُ ههُنا أوْلَى؛ لأنّ الفِطْرَ بالوَطْءِ. ويُمْكِنُ مَنْعُ كَونِ النَّزعِ وَطْئًا، والمُحْرَّمُ ههُنا الاسْتِمْتاعُ، والنَّزْعُ اسْتِمْتاعٌ، فكان مُحرَّمًا، ولِأَنَّ لَمْسَها على وَجْهِ التَّلَذُّذِ بها مُحَرَّمٌ، فلَمْسُ الفَرْجِ بالفَرْجِ أوْلَى بالتَّحْريمِ. فإنْ قيل: فهذا إنَّما يَحْصُلُ ضرورةَ تَرْكِ الوطءِ المحرَّمِ. قُلْنا: فإذا لم يُمْكِنِ الوَطْءُ إلَّا بفِعْلِ مُحَرَّمٍ حُرِّمَ ضرورةَ تَرْكِ الحرامِ. كما لو اختلطَ لَحْمُ الخِنزيرِ بلحمٍ مُباحٍ, لا يُمْكِنُه أَكْلُه إلَّا بأَكْلِ لحمِ الخنزيرِ، حُرِّمَ، ولو اشتَبَهَتْ مَيْتَةٌ بِمُذَكَّاةٍ، أو امرأتُه بأجْنبيَّةٍ، حُرِّمَ الكُلُّ. الوَجْهُ الثانى, أنَّه بالوَطْءِ يَحْصُلُ الطَّلاقُ بعدَ الإِصابةِ، وهو طلاقُ بِدْعَةٍ، وكما يَحْرُمُ إيقاعُه بلسانِه، يَحْرمُ تحقيقُ سَبَبِه. الثالث، أنَّه (٧) يَقَعُ به طلاقُ البِدْعةِ مِن وَجْهٍ آخَرَ، وهو جَمْعُ (٨) الثَّلاثِ، فإنْ وَطِىءَ، فعليه أَنْ يَنْزِعَ حين (٩) يُولِجُ الحَشَفَةَ، ولا يزيدَ على ذلك، ولا يَلْبَثَ ولا يتحرَّكَ عند النَّزْعِ؛ لِأنَّها أجْنبيَّةٌ، فإذا فعلَ ذلك، فلا حَدَّ ولا مَهْرَ؛ لِأنَّه تاركٌ للوطءِ، وإِنْ لَبِثَ أو تَمَّمَ الإِيلاجَ، فلا حَدَّ عليه، لتَمَكُّنِ الشُّبْهَةِ منه، لكَوْنِه وَطْئًا بَعْضُه فى زَوْجتِه، وفى المهرِ وَجْهانِ؛ أحدُهما، يلزمُه؛ لأنَّه حَصَلَ منه وطءٌ مُحَرَّمٌ فى مَحلٍّ غيرِ مَمْلوكٍ، فأوجبَ المهرَ، كما لو أوْلَجَ بعدَ النَّزعِ. والثانى،
(٧) فى أ، ب، م: "أن".(٨) فى أ: "بجمع".(٩) فى ب: "حتى".