al-Khiraqi, and it is better; because his promise to perform the act upon being able to do so is evidence of abandoning the intent of harm, and in it is a type of apology and an announcement of his removal of the harm when it becomes possible for him, while saying: "I have returned (fi'tu) to you," does not achieve any of this. As for the one who is incapable due to castration (jabb) or paralysis, his return is for him to say: "If I were able, I would have intercourse with her." Because that removes what has resulted from his oath of abstinence.
Section: Ihram is like illness, according to the apparent statement of al-Khiraqi. Likewise, based on his analogy, is vowed i'tikaf (seclusion in the mosque) and zihar. Our companions mentioned that the person who has committed zihar is not granted a delay and is ordered to divorce. It is inferred from this that every excuse resulting from his own action that prevents him from intercourse should not be granted a delay. This is the school of al-Shafi'i; because the abstention is due to a cause from him, so it does not negate a duty incumbent upon him. Based on this, he is not ordered to have intercourse, because it is prohibited for him, but he is ordered to divorce. The rationale for the first view is that he is incapable of intercourse due to a matter from which he cannot extract himself, so he resembles the sick person. As for the one who committed zihar, it is said to him: "Either you perform the expiation (kaffarah) and return (fay'ah), or you divorce." If he says: "Grant me a delay until I seek a slave to free, or provide food," then if it is known that he is capable of performing the expiation immediately and only intends to procrastinate and delay, he is not granted a delay; because the right is currently incumbent upon him. Delay is only granted out of necessity, and there is no necessity. If that is not known, he is granted a delay of three days; because it is a short period, and it is not exceeded. If his obligation is fasting, and he requests a delay to fast for two consecutive months, he is not granted a delay; because it is a long period. It is inferred that he should make a return with his tongue as the return of the excused person and be granted a delay until he completes the fasting, similar to our statement regarding the one in ihram. If he has intercourse with her, he has committed a sin, and his oath of abstinence (ila') is dissolved. She has the right to prevent him from it; because this intercourse is prohibited for both of them. The Qadi said: It is incumbent upon her to provide access, and if she refuses, her right is forfeited; because her right is in intercourse, and he has offered it to her, and whenever he has intercourse with her, he has fulfilled her right, and the prohibition is upon him alone, not her. Our view is that it is prohibited intercourse, so providing access to it is not required, just like intercourse during menstruation or post-natal bleeding. This invalidates their argument. We do not concede that the prohibition is upon him alone and not her; for whenever intercourse is prohibited for one of them, it is prohibited for the other; due to it being a single act. If it were permissible for one of them to be singled out with prohibition, the woman would be singled out with the prohibition of intercourse during menstruation, post-natal bleeding, her ihram, and her fasting; due to the cause being specific to her.
(4) In B: "saying". (5) In B: "the harm". (6) In the original and B: "castration (jabb)".
الخِرَقِىُّ، وهو أحْسَنُ؛ لِأنَّ وَعْدَه بالفِعْلِ عندَ القُدْرَةِ عليه، دليلٌ على تَرْكِ (٤) قَصْدِ الإِضرارِ، وفيه نوعٌ مِن الاعْتِذارِ، وإخبارٌ بإزالَتِه للضَّرَرِ (٥) عندَ إمْكانِه، ولا يَحْصُلُ بقولِه: فِئْتُ إليكِ. شىءٌ من هذا. فأمَّا العاجِزُ لجَبٍّ (٦) أو شَلَلٍ، فَفيْئَتُه أَنْ يقولَ: لو قَدَرْتُ لجامعتُها. لأنَّ ذلك يُزِيلُ ما حَصَلَ بإيلائِه.
فصل: والإِحْرامُ كالمَرَضِ، فى ظاهر قَوْلِ الْخِرَقِىِّ. وكذلك على قِياسِه الاعتكافُ المَنْذورُ والظِّهارُ. وذكر أصحابُنا أَنَّ المُظاهِرَ لا يُمْهَلُ، ويُؤْمَرُ بالطَّلاقِ. فيُخَرَّجُ من هذا أَنَّ كُلَّ عُذْرٍ مِنْ فعلِه يَمْنَعُه الوَطْءَ لا يُمْهَلُ مِن أجْلِه. وهو مذهبُ الشَّافِعِىِّ؛ لِأنَّ الامْتناعَ بِسَبَبٍ منه، فلا يُسْقِطُ حكْمًا واجبًا عليه. فعلى هذا لا يُؤْمَرُ بالوَطءِ؛ لأنَّه مُحَرَّمٌ عليه، ولكن يُؤْمَرُ بالطَّلاقِ. ووَجْهُ القولِ الأوَّلِ، أنَّه عاجزٌ عن الوَطْءِ بأمرٍ لا يُمْكِنُه الخروجُ منه، فأَشْبَهَ المريضَ. فأمَّا المُظاهرُ، فيقال له: إمَّا أن تُكفِّرَ وتَفِىءَ، وإمَّا أَنْ تُطَلِّقَ. فإنْ قال: أمْهِلُونِى حتَّى أطْلُبَ رَقَبَةً، أو أُطْعِمَ. فإنْ عُلِمَ أنَّه قادِرٌ على التَّكْفيرِ فى الحالِ، وإنَّما يَقْصِدُ المُدافعةَ والتَّأخيرَ، لم يُمْهَلْ؛ لِأنَّ الحقَّ حالٌّ عليه. وإنَّما يُمْهَلُ للحاجةِ، ولا حاجةَ. وإِنْ لم يُعْلَمْ ذلك، أُمْهِلَ ثلاثةَ أيَّامٍ؛ لأنَّها قريبةٌ، ولا يزادُ على ذلك. وإِنْ كان فَرْضُه الصِّيامَ، فطَلَبَ الإِمْهالَ ليصومَ شهرَيْنِ متتابعَيْنِ، لم يُمْهَلْ؛ لِأنَّه كثيرٌ. ويَتَخَرَّجُ أن يَفِىءَ بلسانِه فَيْئَةَ المَعْذورِ، ويُمْهَلَ حتَّى يصومَ، كقَوْلِنا فى المُحْرِمِ. فإنْ وَطِئَها فقد عَصَى، وانْحَلَّ إيلاؤُه. ولها مَنْعُه منه؛ لأنَّ هذا الوَطْءَ مُحَرَّمٌ عليهما. وقال القاضى: يَلْزَمُها التَّمْكينُ، وإن امْتَنَعَتْ سَقَطَ حقُّها؛ لِأنَّ حقَّها فى الوَطْءِ، وقد بذَلَه لها، ومتى وَطِئَها فقد وفَّاها حقَّها، والتَّحْريمُ عليه دُونَها. ولَنا، أنَّه وَطْءٌ حرامٌ، فلا يَلْزَمُ التَّمْكينُ منه، كالوَطْءِ فى الحَيْضِ والنِّفاسِ. وهذا يَنْقُضُ دليلَهم. ولا نُسَلِّمُ كَوْنَ التَّحريمِ عليه دُونَها؛ فإنَّ الوَطْءَ متى حَرُمَ على أحدِهما حَرُمَ على
(٤) فى ب: "قول".(٥) فى ب: "الضرر".(٦) فى الأصل، ب: "بجب".