the perpetrator is not liable for more than one blood money. If he cut a finger, and it spread to his life, the full blood money would be obligatory; likewise, if it spread to the life of a free Muslim, his full blood money is obligatory. As for if he wounded an apostate or an enemy combatant [harbi], and the wound spread to his life, there is neither retribution nor blood money for it, whether he accepted Islam before the spreading or did not accept it, because the wound is not guaranteed [damana], so its spreading is not guaranteed, unlike the previous case.
Section: If he cut the hand of a Muslim and he apostatized, then he died from the spreading of the wound, no retribution, blood money, or expiation is obligatory for the life, because it is the life of an apostate who is neither protected [ma'sum] nor guaranteed [madmun]. The same applies if he cut the hand of a Dhimmi and he became an enemy combatant, then died from his wounds. As for the hand, the correct view is that there is no retribution for it. The Qadi mentioned (18) a view regarding the obligation of retribution for it because the ruling of the cutting became established with the cessation of the ruling of its spreading, so it is similar to if he cut off his limb then killed him, or another person came and killed him. Regarding the obligation of retribution, there are two opinions for al-Shafi'i. As for us, it is a cutting that is a killing (19) for which killing is not obligatory, so the cutting is not obligatory, just as if he had cut [a limb] other than at a joint. It differs from what they analogized it to, for the cutting did not become a killing. Is the blood money of the limb obligatory? There are two views: One of them is that there is no liability for it, because it became evident that it was a killing of one who is not protected. The second is that it is obligatory, because the lapse of the ruling of the spreading of the wound (20) does not negate its liability, just as if he cut a man's limb, then another person killed him. Based on this, is the liability obligatory with the blood money of the severed limb, or with the lesser of the two things, his blood money or the blood money of the life? There are two views: One of them is that the blood money of the severed part is obligatory; so if he cut his hands and feet, then he apostatized and died, there are two blood monies for it, because the apostasy severed the ruling of the spreading, so it resembles the cessation of its ruling by its healing or by another person killing him. The second is that the lesser of the two is obligatory, because (21) if he had not apostatized, more than the blood money of the life would not have been obligatory, so with apostasy it is more appropriate. Furthermore, it is a cutting that became a killing, so no more than one blood money was obligatory, just as if he had not apostatized. It differs from the premise of the first view, for it did not become a killing. Moreover, the healing and the killing prevented the occurrence of the spreading, while the apostasy prevented its guarantee but did not prevent it from being rendered a killing. Al-Shafi'i has a detailing similar to what we have said.
(18) In the original: "wa dhakarahu" (and he mentioned it). (19) In B: "qabla" (before). (20) In B and M: "al-jirah" (the wounds). (21) In A, B, and M: "wa li-annahu" (and because it).
لم يَلْزَمِ الجانِيَ أكْثرُ من دِيَةٍ، ولو قَطَع إصْبَعًا، فسَرَى إلى نَفْسِه، لوَجَبَتِ الدِّيَةُ كاملةً، فكذلك إذا سَرَتْ إلى نَفْسِ حُرٍّ مُسْلمٍ، تَجِبُ دِيَتُه كَاملةً. فأمَّا إن جَرَحَ مُرْتَدًّا، أو حَرْبِيًّا، فسَرَى الجُرْحُ إلى نَفْسِه، فلا قِصاصَ فيه ولا دِيَةَ، سواءٌ أسْلَم قبلَ السِّرايةِ أو لم يُسْلِمْ؛ لأنَّ الجُرْحَ غيرُ مَضْمُونٍ، فلم يَضْمَنْ سِرَايَتَه، بخلافِ التي قبلَها.
فصل: ولو قَطَعَ يَدَ مُسْلِمٍ فارتَدَّ، ثم مات بسِرايةِ الجُرْحِ، لم يَجِبْ في النَّفْسِ قِصاصٌ ولا دِيَةٌ ولا كَفَّارةٌ؛ لأنَّها نَفْسُ مُرْتَدٍّ غيرِ مَعْصُومٍ ولا مَضْمُونٍ، وكذلك لو قَطَعَ يَدَ ذِمِّيٍّ فصارَ حَرْبِيًّا، ثم مات من جِرَاحِه. وأمَّا اليَدُ، فالصَّحيحُ أنَّه لا قِصاصَ فيها. وذكَر (١٨) القاضي وَجْهًا في وُجُوبِ القِصاصِ فيها؛ لأنَّ القَطْعَ اسْتَقَرَّ حُكْمُه بانْقِطاعِ حُكْمِ سِرَايَتِه، فأشْبَهَ ما لو قَطَعَ طَرَفَه ثم قَتَلَه، أو جاء آخَرُ فقَتَلَه، وللشافِعِيِّ في وُجُوبِ القِصاصِ قَوْلان. ولَنا، أنَّه قَطْعٌ هو قَتْلٌ (١٩) لم يَجِبْ به القَتْلُ، فلم يجبِ القطعُ، كما لو قَطَعَ من غيرِ مَفْصِلٍ، وفارَقَ ما قاسُوا عليه، فإنَّ القَطْعَ لم يَصِرْ قَتْلًا. وهل تجبُ دِيَةُ الطَّرَفِ؟ فيه وَجْهان؛ أحدهما، لا ضَمانَ فيه؛ لأنَّه تبَيَّنَ أنَّه قَتْلٌ لغيرِ مَعْصُومٍ. والثاني، تجبُ؛ لأنَّ سُقُوطَ حُكْمِ سِرَايةِ الجُرْحِ (٢٠) لا يُسْقِطُ ضَمانَه، كما لو قَطَعَ طَرَفَ رَجُلٍ، ثم قَتَلَه آخَرُ. فعلى هذا، هل يجبُ ضَمانُه بدِيَةِ المَقطُوعِ، أو بأقَلِّ الأمْرَيْنِ من دِيَتهِ أو دِيَةِ النَّفْسِ؟ فيه وَجْهان؛ أحدهما، تجبُ دِيَةُ المَقْطُوعِ، فلو قَطَعَ يَدَيْه ورِجْلَيْه، ثم ارْتَدَّ ومات، ففيه دِيَتَانِ؛ لأنَّ الرِّدَةَ قَطَعَتْ حُكْمَ السِّرَايةِ، فأشْبَهَ انْقِطاعَ حُكْمِها بانْدِمالِها، أو بقَتْلِ آخرَ له. والثاني، يجبُ أقَلُّ الأمْرَيْنِ؛ لأنَّه (٢١) لو لم يَرْتَدَّ لم يجبْ أكْثرُ من دِيَةِ النَّفْسِ، فمع الرِّدَّةِ أَوْلَى، ولأنَّه قَطْعٌ صار قَتْلًا، فلم يجبْ أكْثَرُ من دِيَةٍ، كما لو لم يَرْتَدَّ، وفارَقَ أصْلَ الوَجْه الأوَّلِ، فإنَّه لم يَصِرْ قَتْلًا، ولأنَّ الانْدِمالَ والقَتْلَ مَنَعَ وُجُودَ السِّرايةِ، والرِّدَّةَ مَنَعَتْ ضَمانَها، ولم تَمْنَعْ جَعْلَها قَتْلًا. وللشافعيِّ من التفصيلِ نحوٌ مما قُلْنا.
(١٨) في الأصل: "وذكره".(١٩) في ب: "قبل".(٢٠) في ب، م: "الجراح".(٢١) في أ، ب، م: "ولأنه".