Section: Whenever we say that he is entitled to exact [retaliation] by the like of what [the perpetrator] did to his ward, if he prefers to limit himself (15) to striking his neck, he may do so, and that is more meritorious. If he severs the limbs that the perpetrator severed, or some of them, and then pardons him from killing him, the same applies; because he is forgoing a portion of his right. If he severs some of his limbs and then pardons him in exchange for blood money, he is not entitled to that; because all of what [the perpetrator] did to his ward does not necessitate more than one blood money payment. Thus, it is not permissible for him to exact a portion of it and become entitled to the full blood money. If he does so, he is entitled to whatever remains of the blood money; if nothing of it remains, then he is entitled to nothing. If we say: He is not entitled to exact [retaliation] except by striking the neck, and he exacts it from him by the like of what he did, then he has acted wrongly, and there is nothing upon him except the sin; because the perpetrator's act regarding the limbs did not necessitate anything upon him that is specific to them, and likewise is the act of the one exacting [retaliation]. If he severs (16) one limb and then pardons him in exchange for blood money, he is not entitled to anything but the remainder of it. If he severs that which necessitates blood money and then pardons him, he is not entitled to anything. If he severs that which necessitates more than the blood money and then pardons him, it is possible that he would be held liable for what exceeded the blood money; because he is not entitled to more than the blood money, and he has done what necessitates more than it, so the excess is upon him. It is also possible that he is not held liable for anything; because if he had killed him, he would not have been held liable for anything, so if he refrains from killing him and pardons him, it is more appropriate that he not be held liable for anything. Also, because he only did a part of what was done to his ward, he is not held liable for anything, just as if we were to say: He is entitled to exact [retaliation] by the like of what was done to him.

Section: If he severs his hands and feet, or wounds him with a wound that would necessitate retaliation if it were isolated, and then it spreads to the life, he is entitled to retaliation in the life. Is he entitled to exact (17) the amputation before the killing? There are two narrations [of the school], both of which the Qadi mentioned, and he based them on the two narrations mentioned in the issue. One of them (18) is that he is not entitled to amputate the limb. This is the school of Abu Hanifa, because that leads to an excess over what the first [perpetrator] committed, and retaliation relies upon equality. Whenever there is a fear of excess in it, it lapses.