Section: If he cuts the hand of a man, then kills another, and the cutting subsequently spreads to the life of the person whose hand was cut and he dies, he is a killer of both. If they dispute over who should carry out the killing, he is killed for the one he killed first, because the obligation of killing for that one is earlier; for the killing for the one whose hand he cut only became obligatory upon the spreading [of the wound], which is later than the killing of the other. As for the cutting, if we say that it is to be fulfilled by way of retaliation, he is cut first, then he is killed for the one he killed, and half the blood-money becomes due to the first [victim]. If we say that the cutting is not to be fulfilled [when combined with the death penalty], the full blood-money is due to him, and his limb is not cut. It is possible that the cutting should be due in all cases, because the cutting only enters into the killing when the killing is fulfilled; so if fulfilling the killing becomes impossible, fulfilling the [retaliation for the] limb becomes due because its requirements exist and there is no obstacle to its fulfillment, just as if it had not spread. If the cutting of the hand did not spread to the life, his hand is cut first, then he is killed, and it makes no difference whether the cutting was earlier or later. Abu Hanifah and al-Shafi'i held this view. Malik said: He is killed and not cut, because if he is killed, the limb is destroyed, so there is no benefit in cutting it, similar to the case if both [injuries] were against one person. Our argument is that these are two crimes against two men, so they do not overlap, like the cutting of the hands of two men. The analogy he mentioned is not correct, because he already said: if he cuts a man's hand then kills him with the intent of mutilating him, he is both cut and killed. We agree with him on this in one narration; thus, consensus has been established between us and him that overlap is negated in principle, so how can he draw an analogy based upon it! Rather, it turns into evidence against him; we say: he cut and he killed, so he is subjected to retaliation for what he did, just as if he did it to one man with the intent of mutilating him. The ruling is established in the case of dispute by way of warning, for if the right of one person does not overlap [with the killing], the right of two is more entitled [not to overlap], and by this, what he said regarding the meaning is invalidated.
Section: If he cuts a finger from the right hand of a man, and a right hand of another, and the cutting of the finger was earlier, his finger is cut in retaliation, and the other is given a choice between pardoning for blood-money, or retaliation and taking the blood-money of the
(14) In B and M: "alladhi". (15) In the original: "bi-wujud" (by the existence of). In M: "li-wujub" (for the obligation of). (16) In M: "wa-minhum" (and among them). (17) Omitted from the original. (18) In the original: "al-akhir" (the latter).
فصل: وإن قَطَعَ يَدَ رَجُلٍ، ثم قَتَلَ آخَرَ، ثم سَرَى القَطْعُ إلى نفس المَقْطوعِ فمات، فهو قاتِلٌ لهما، فإذا تشاحَّا في المُسْتَوْفِى للقَتْلِ، قُتِلَ بالذى قَتَلَه؛ لأنَّ وُجُوبَ القَتْلِ عليه أسْبَقُ، فإنَّ القَتْلَ بالذى قَطَعه إنَّما وَجَبَ عندَ السِّرايةِ، وهى مُتأخِّرةٌ عن قَتْلِ الآخَرِ، وأمَّا القَطْعُ، فإن قُلْنا: إنَّه يُسْتَوْفَى منه مثلُ ما فَعَلَ. فإنَّه يُقْطَعُ له أوّلًا، ثم يُقْتَلُ للذى (١٤) قَتَلَه، ويجبُ للأوَّلِ نِصْفُ الدِّيَةِ. وإن قُلْنا: لا يُسْتَوفَى القَطْعُ. وجَبَتْ له الدِّيَةُ كاملةً، ولم يُقْطَعْ طَرَفُه. ويَحْتَمِلُ أن يَجِبَ له القَطْعُ على كلِّ حالٍ؛ لأنَّ القَطْعَ إنَّما يدخُلُ في القتلِ عندَ اسْتِيفاءِ القَتْلِ. فإذا تعذَّرَ اسْتيفاءُ القتلِ، وجَبَ اسْتيفاءُ الطَّرَفِ لوُجودِ (١٥) مُقْتَضِيه، وعَدَمِ المانعِ من اسْتِيفائِه، كما لو لم يَسْرِ. ولوكان قَطْعُ اليَدِ لم يَسْرِ إلى النَّفْسِ، فإنَّه تُقْطَعُ يَدُه أوَّلًا، ثم يُقْتَلُ، وسواءٌ تقَدَّمَ القَطْعُ أو تأخَّرَ. وبهذا قال أبو حنيفةَ، والشافعيُّ. وقال مالكٌ: يُقْتَلُ ولا يُقْطَعُ؛ لأنَّه إذا قُتِلَ تَلِفَ الطَّرَفُ، فلا فائِدةَ في القَطْعِ، فأشْبَهَ ما لو كانا لواحدٍ. ولَنا، أنَّهما جِنايتانِ على رَجُلَيْنِ، فلم يتدَاخَلَا، كقَطْعِ يَدَىْ رَجُلَيْنِ. وما ذكَره من القياسِ غيرُ صحيحٍ؛ لأنَّه قد قال: لو قَطَعَ يَدَ رَجُلٍ، ثم قَتَلَه يَقْصِدُ المثْلَةَ به، قُطِعَ وقُتِلَ. ونحن نُوافِقُه على هذا في روايةٍ، فقد حَصَلَ الإِجماعُ منَّا ومنه (١٦) على انْتِفاءِ التَّداخُلِ في الأصْلِ، فكيف يَقِيسُ عليه! ولكنَّه يَنْقَلِبُ دليلًا عليه، فنقولُ: قَطَعَ وقَتَلَ، فيُسْتَوْفَى منه مثلُ ما فَعَلَ، كما لو فَعَلَه برَجُلٍ واحدٍ يَقْصِدُ المُثْلةَ به (١٧)، ويَثْبُتُ الحُكْمُ في مَحَلِّ النِّزاعِ بطريقِ التَّنْبِيه، فإنَّه إذا لم يَتَدَاخَلْ حَقُّ الواحدِ، فحقُّ الاثْنَيْنِ أَوْلَى، ويَبْطُلُ بهذا ما قالَه من المَعْنَى.
فصل: وإن قَطَعَ إصْبَعًا من يمينِ رَجُلٍ، ويَمِينًا لآخَرَ، وكان قَطْعُ الإِصْبَعِ أسْبَقَ، قُطِعَتْ إصْبَعُه قِصاصًا، وخُيِّرَ الآخَرُ (١٨) بينَ العَفْوِ إلى الدِّيَةِ، وبينَ القِصاصِ وأَخْذِ دِيَةِ
(١٤) في ب، م: "الذي".(١٥) في الأصل: "بوجود". وفي م: "لوجوب".(١٦) في م: "ومنهم".(١٧) سقط من: الأصل.(١٨) في الأصل: "الأخير".