And al-Shafi'i said: Rather, it is guaranteed (subject to compensation), because it is a progression of a crime, so it is guaranteed, just as if he had not retaliated. As for us, we rely on the aforementioned report, and because he hastened to do something he was not permitted to hasten, thus his right was voided, like the killer of the one from whom he inherits; in this, it differs from one who did not retaliate. According to this, if both cuts progress, and both the perpetrator and the one who carried out the retaliation die, then both cases are considered void (hadr). Abu Hanifah said: The compensation for each of them is required; because the progression of each of them is guaranteed, then they offset each other, and thus they are dropped. Al-Shafi'i said: If the victim dies first, then the perpetrator dies, it is considered retaliation for him, because he died from the progression of the cut, so he died by the action of the victim. If the perpetrator dies, it is the same in one of the two views, while in the other, the death of the perpetrator is void (hadr), and the heir of the victim receives half of the blood money (diyah). As for if one of the two cuts progresses without the other, then in our view it is void and there is no compensation for it. In the view of Abu Hanifah, the compensation for its progression is required. In the view of al-Shafi'i, if the crime progresses, it is guaranteed, but if the execution of retaliation progresses, its compensation is not required. The basis for that is the previously mentioned disagreement.
Section: If the wound from the crime heals, and he retaliated for it, then it reopened and progressed, then its progression is guaranteed, but the progression of the execution of retaliation is not guaranteed; because he retaliated after the retaliation was permissible. According to this, if he cut a man's hand, and it healed, and then he retaliated, and then the victim's wound reopened and he died, then his heir has the right to kill the perpetrator, because he died from his crime. If he pardoned [the retribution] in exchange for blood money, he receives nothing, because he had already satisfied, through the cutting, that which is valued at blood money, which is his two hands. If the execution of retaliation progresses, nothing is required either; because the retaliation had already ceased upon his death, and the blood money cannot be mandated for the reason we mentioned. If what was cut by the crime was a hand, his heir has the choice between retaliation for the life (qisas) or pardoning in exchange for half the blood money. Whenever the retaliation ceases due to the death of the perpetrator or otherwise, half of the blood money becomes due from the perpetrator's estate, or from his wealth if he is alive.
(37) Omitted from: M. Note: check (nazar). (38) Omitted from: M.
والشافعيُّ: بل هي مَضْمُونةٌ؛ لأنَّها سِرَايةُ جِنَايةٍ، فكانت مَضْمُونةً، كما لو لم يَقْتَصَّ. ولَنا، الخبرُ المذكورُ، ولأنه اسْتَعْجَلَ ما لم يكُنْ له اسْتِعْجَالُه، فبَطَلَ حَقُّه، كقاتِلِ مَوْرُوثِه، وبهذا فارَقَ مَنْ لم يَقْتَصَّ. فعلى هذا، لو سَرَى القَطْعانِ جميعًا، فمات الجاني والمُسْتَوْفِى، فهما هَدْرٌ. وقال أبو حنيفةَ: يَجِبُ ضَمانُ كلِّ واحدٍ منهما؛ [لأنَّ سِرَايةَ كلِّ واحدٍ منهما] (٣٧) مَضْمونةٌ، ثم يتقاصَّان فيَسْقُطانِ. وقال الشافعيُّ: إن ماتَ المَجْنِىُّ عليه أَوَّلًا، ثم مات الجانِى، كان قِصاصًا به (٣٨)؛ لأنَّه مات من سِرَايةِ القَطْعِ، فقد مات بفِعْلِ المَجْنِىِّ عليه، وإن مات الجانِى، فكذلك في أحدِ الوَجْهَيْنِ، وفى الآخَرِ، يكونُ مَوْتُ الجانِى هَدْرًا، ولوَلِىِّ المَجْنِى عليه نِصْفُ الدِّيَةِ. فأمَّا إن سَرَى أحدُ القَطْعَيْنِ دون صاحِبِه، فعندَنا هو هَدْرٌ، لا ضَمانَ فيه. وعند أبى حنيفةَ، يجبُ ضَمانُ سِرَايتِه. وعندَ الشافعىِّ، إن سَرَتِ الجِنايةُ فهى مَضْمُونةٌ، وإن سَرَى الاسْتِيفاءُ، لم يَجِبْ ضَمانُه. ومَبْنَى ذلك على ما تقَدَّمَ من الخِلافِ.
فصل: وإن انْدَمَلَ جُرْحُ الجِنايةِ، فاقْتَصَّ منه، ثم انْتَقَضَ فسَرَى، فسِرَايَتُه مَضْمُونةٌ، وسِرَايةُ الاسْتِيفاءِ غيرُ مَضْمُونةٍ؛ لأنَّه اقْتَصَّ بعدَ جَوازِ الاقْتِصاصِ. فعلى هذا، لو قَطَعَ يَدَ رَجُلٍ، فبَرَأ، فاقْتَصَّ، ثم انْتَقَضَ جُرْحُ المَجْنِىِّ عليه، فمات، فلوَلِيِّه قَتْلُ الجانِى، لأنَّه مات من جِنَايَتِه، وإن عَفَا إلى الدِّيَةِ، فلا شىءَ له، لأنَّه اسْتَوْفَى بالقَطْعِ ما قِيمَتُه دِيَةٌ وهو يَدَاه، وإن سَرَى الاسْتِيفاءُ، لم يَجِبْ أيضًا شيءٌ؛ لأنَّ القِصاصَ قد سَقَطَ بَمْوتِه، والدِّيَةُ لا يُمْكِنُ إِيجابُها؛ لما ذكرْنا. وإن كان المَقْطُوعُ بالجِنايةِ يَدًا، فوَلِيُّه بالخِيارِ بين القِصاصِ في النَّفْسِ وبين العَفْوِ إلى نِصْفِ الدِّيَةِ. ومتى سَقَطَ القِصاصُ بمَوْتِ الجانِى أو غيرِه، وَجَبَ نِصْفُ الدِّيَةِ في تَركَةِ الجانِى، أو مالِه إن كان حَيًّا.
(٣٧) سقط من: م. نقل نظر.(٣٨) سقط من: م.