a group who take turns, or if it is possible for him to be fed with the milk of a sheep or similar, it is permissible to kill her. It is recommended for the guardian to delay [the execution] due to the harm that would befall the child by the change in milk and the drinking of animal milk.

Section: If she claims to be pregnant, there are two views regarding this. The first is that she is to be detained until her pregnancy becomes apparent, because pregnancy has hidden signs that she knows about herself and others do not, so it is necessary to exercise caution for the sake of the pregnancy until it is established that her claim is false. Furthermore, it is a matter that pertains specifically to her, so her word regarding it is accepted, similar to menstruation. The second view, mentioned by the Qadi, is that she is to be presented to expert women; if they testify to her pregnancy, she is delayed, and if they testify to her innocence, she is not delayed, because the right is due against her and should not be delayed based on her mere claim.

Section: If one retaliates against a pregnant woman, he has acted erroneously, and the authority who enabled him to enforce the retaliation has also acted erroneously. Both of them bear the sin if they were aware [of the situation] or if there was negligence on their part. If one of them knew or was negligent, the sin lies upon him. Then we examine the case: if she did not miscarry the child, there is no compensation for it because we did not verify its existence and life. If it was born dead, or alive at a time when a child like it would not survive, there is a penalty of ghurrah (an indemnity for a fetus). If it was born alive at a time when a child like it would typically survive, and then died as a result of the crime, blood money is required for it. Upon whom does the liability fall? We examine this: if the Imam and the guardian were both aware of the pregnancy and the prohibition of enforcing the retaliation, or were both ignorant of both matters, or were ignorant of one of them, or if the guardian was aware of that while the one who enabled him to enforce the retaliation was not, then the liability rests upon the guardian alone. This is because he is the direct perpetrator, while the ruler who enabled him is a secondary cause, and whenever the direct perpetrator and the one who provided the cause come together, the liability rests on the direct perpetrator rather than the secondary cause, like a digger of a pit with one who pushes a person into it. If the ruler knew but the guardian did not, the liability is on the ruler alone, because the direct perpetrator is excused, so the liability rests upon the secondary cause, similar to a master who orders his slave to kill and the slave is a foreigner who does not know the prohibition of killing, and similar to witnesses of retaliation if they retract their testimony after the enforcement.