Thus, the liability is upon the one who ordered it, just as if he had ordered his non-Arab slave to kill a protected person. Other than Abu Bakr said: There are two views regarding the validity of the pardon, based on the two narrations concerning the agent: does he cease to be an agent upon the dismissal of the principal or not? Al-Shafi'i has two opinions, similar to these two views. If we say: The pardon is not valid, then there is no liability upon anyone, because he killed one whose killing is required by the order of the one entitled to do so (18). If we say: The pardon is valid, there is no retaliation in it, because the agent killed someone he believed to be permissible to kill for a reason for which he is excused, so it is similar to if he killed someone in the Abode of War (Dar al-Harb) whom he believed to be a combatant. Blood money is binding upon the agent, because if he had known, retaliation would have been binding upon him; thus, since he did not know, liability attaches to him, just as if he had killed a person who had apostatized but had converted to Islam before he became aware of his conversion. He may seek recourse for this from the principal, because the principal deceived him by authorizing him to kill and by his negligence (19) in failing to inform him of the pardon, so he may seek recourse from him, like the one who commits deceit in a marriage regarding the free status of a slave woman or marrying a woman with a defect. It is possible that he may not seek recourse from him, because the pardon is an act of beneficence on his part, and it does not necessitate recourse. Based on this, the blood money is upon the agent's 'aqila (tribal group/kinsmen). This is the choice of Abu al-Khattab, because this occurred in the manner of an error, so it is similar to if he killed a Muslim in the Abode of War whom he believed to be a combatant. The Qadi said: It is from the agent's own wealth, because it is purely intentional. This is not correct, because if it were purely intentional, it would have necessitated retaliation, and because it is a condition for an act to be purely intentional that one be aware of the state of the subject and that he is a protected person, and this was not present. If he says: It is intentional error ('amd al-khata'), then intentional error is borne by the 'aqila. Al-Khiraqi mentioned this, and it is indicated by the report of the woman who killed her neighbor (20) and her fetus with a tent peg (21), for the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) ruled that the blood money be paid by her 'aqila (22). The companions of al-Shafi'i (23) differed over these two views, so according to the opinion of
(18) In B and M: "mustahiqquhu" (the one entitled to it). (19) In B and M: "bitafritihi" (by his negligence). (20) In M: "jariyatiha" (her slave girl). (21) Mistah: one of the poles of a tent. (22) Narrated by al-Nasa'i, in: Chapter on killing a woman for a woman, from the Book of Qasama (Oath). Al-Mujtaba, 8/19. And Ibn Majah, in: Chapter on the blood money for a fetus, from the Book of Blood Money. Sunan Ibn Majah, 2/882. And al-Darimi, in: Chapter on the blood money for a fetus, from the Book of Blood Money. Sunan al-Darimi, 2/196, 197. And Imam Ahmad, in: al-Musnad, 1/364, 4/80. (23) In the original and B: "the Prophet - peace and blessings of Allah be upon him -."
فكان الضَّمانُ على الآمِرِ، كما لو أمَرَ عَبْدَه الأعْجَمِيَّ بقَتْلِ مَعْصُومٍ. وقال غيرُ أبي بكرٍ: في صِحَّةِ العَفْوِ وَجْهان؛ بِناءً على الرِّوايتَيْنِ في الوكيلِ، هل يَنْعَزِلُ بعَزْلِ المُوَكِّلِ أو لا؟ وللشافعيِّ قَوْلان، كالوَجْهَيْنِ. فإن قُلْنا: لا يَصِحُّ العَفْوُ. فلا ضَمانَ على أحدٍ؛ لأنَّه قَتَلَ مَنْ يَجِبُ قَتْلُه بأمْرِ مُسْتَحِقِّه (١٨). وإن قُلْنا: يَصِحُّ العَفْوُ. فلا قِصاصَ فيه؛ لأنَّ الوَكِيلَ قَتَلَ مَنْ يَعْتَقِدُ إباحةَ قَتْلِه بسَبَبٍ هو مَعْذُورٌ فيه، فأشْبَهَ ما لو قَتَلَ في دارِ الحَرْبِ مَنْ يَعْتَقِدُه حَرْبِيًّا. وتجبُ الدِّيةُ على الوكيلِ؛ لأنَّه لو عَلِمَ لَوَجَبَ عليه القصِاصُ، فإذا لم يَعْلَمْ تعَلَّقَ به الضَّمانُ، كما لو قَتَلَ مُرْتَدًّا قد أسْلَمَ قبلَ عِلْمِه بإسْلامِه، ويَرْجِعُ بها على المُوَكِّلِ؛ لأنَّه غَرَّهُ بتَسْلِيطِه على القَتْلِ وتَفْرِيطِه (١٩) في تَرْكِ إعْلامِه بالعَفْوِ، فيَرْجِعُ عليه، كالغَارِّ في النِّكاحِ بحُرِّيةِ أمَةٍ، أو تَزَوُّجِ مَعِيبَةٍ. ويَحْتَملُ أن لا يَرْجِعَ عليه؛ لأنَّ العَفْوَ إحسانٌ منه، فلا يَقْتَضِي الرُّجوعَ عليه. فعلى هذا، تكونُ الديةُ على عاقِلَةِ الوَكِيلِ. وهذا اختيارُ أبى الخَطَّابِ؛ لأنَّ هذا جَرَىَ مَجْرَى الخَطإِ، فأشْبَهَ ما لو قَتَلَ في دارِ الحَرْبِ مُسْلِمًا يَعْتَقِدُه حَرْبِيًا. وقال القاضي: هو في مالِ الوَكِيلِ؛ لأنَّه عن عَمْدٍ مَحْضٍ. وهذا لا يَصِحُّ؛ لأنَّه لو كان عَمْدًا مَحْضًا لأوْجَبَ القِصاصَ، ولأنَّه يُشْتَرطُ في العَمْدِ المَحْضِ أن يكونَ عالِمًا بحالِ المَحَلِّ، وكَوْنِه مَعْصُومًا، ولم يُوجَدْ هذا. وإن قال: هو عَمْدُ الخَطَإِ. فعَمْدُ الخطإِ تَحْمِلُه العاقِلةُ. ذَكَرَه الْخِرَقِيُّ ودَلَّ عليه خَبَرُ المرأةِ التي قَتَلَتْ جَارَتَها (٢٠) وجَنِينَها بمِسْطَحٍ (٢١)، فقَضَى النَّبِيُّ -صلى اللَّه عليه وسلم- بالدِّيَةِ على عاقِلَتِها (٢٢). واخْتَلَفَ أصحابُ الشافعيِّ (٢٣) على هذينِ الوَجْهَيْنِ، فعلَى قولِ
(١٨) في ب، م: "يستحقه".(١٩) في ب، م: "بتفريطه".(٢٠) في م: "جاريتها".(٢١) مسطح: عود من أعواد الخباء.(٢٢) أخرجه النسائي، في: باب قتل المرأة بالمرأة، من كتاب القسامة. المجتبى ٨/ ١٩. وابن ماجه، في: باب دية الجنين، من كتاب الديات. سنن ابن ماجه ٢/ ٨٨٢. والدارمي، في: باب في دية الجنين، من كتاب الديات. سنن الدارمي ٢/ ١٩٦، ١٩٧. والإِمام أحمد، في: المسند ١/ ٣٦٤، ٤/ ٨٠.(٢٣) في الأصل، ب: "النبي -صلى اللَّه عليه وسلم-".