penetrating wound (ja'ifah), it shall not exceed the indemnity of the penetrating wound. And what is not like that, what the discretionary compensation determines is due, because the location is different. If it is said: It has become due in some parts of the body more than what is due in its entirety, and it has become due for the functions of the tongue more than what is due for it? We say: The blood money for the person (nafs) is only due as a substitute for the soul, and the limbs are not parts of it, unlike our issue here. This was mentioned by al-Qadi. The speech of al-Khiraqi allows for the interpretation that the restriction on exceeding the amount is specific to the head and face, due to his saying: "unless the injury is to the head or face, in which case it shall not exceed the indemnity of the fixed-amount injury."
Section: If the discretionary compensation for head wounds that are less than the mudihah (exposing wound) reaches the amount of the indemnity for the mudihah, or exceeds it, then the apparent meaning of al-Khiraqi's statement is that the indemnity of the mudihah is due. Al-Qadi said: It must be slightly less than it, according to what ijtihad (independent legal reasoning) leads to. This is the school of al-Shafi'i, so that there may not be due for a part of it what is due for the whole of it. The argument for al-Khiraqi's position is that the requirement of the evidence is the obligation of what the discretionary compensation determined, and the excess over the mudihah's indemnity only fell away due to its contradiction of the text or the implication of the text. Thus, in what did not increase, one must remain upon the original principle. Furthermore, what is established by implication may be equivalent to that which is explicitly stated in the ruling, and it is not necessary that it exceed it. Just as when it was textually stated that the ransom for injury (fidyat al-adha) is due for the excused person, it was not necessary for it to be increased for the one who has no excuse. It is not impossible for what is due for the part to be what is due for the whole, evidenced by the obligation of the blood money for the fingers being equal to the blood money for the entire hand, and the glans of the penis being equal to that which is in its entirety. If it is said: This was due by specific legal ordinance, not by appraisal. We say: If the ruling is established by a text of the Lawgiver, it is not impossible for its like to be established by analogy to it and the ijtihad leading to it. In summary, the discretionary compensation is evidence for abandoning acting upon it regarding the excess due to a meaning that is absent in the equivalent case, so one must act upon it there because there is no opposing evidence. And if what they mentioned is correct, then it is appropriate to decrease it by the minimum amount through which the prohibited equality is attained, and the remainder is due, acting in accordance with the evidence requiring it. And Allah knows best.
(2) In [B]: "by the text" (bil-nass). (3) In [M]: "and it did not" (wa-lam). (4) Omitted from: [M].
الجائفة، لم يَزِدْ على أرْشِ الجائفةِ، وما لم يكُنْ كذلك، وجبَ ما أخْرَجَتْه الحُكومةُ؛ لأنَّ المَحَلَّ مُخْتلِفٌ. فإن قِيلَ: فقد وجبَ في بعض البدَنِ أكثرُ ممَّا وجبَ في جميعِه، ووَجبَ في مَنافعِ اللِّسانِ أكثرُ من الواجبِ فيه؟ قُلْنا: إنَّما وجَبتْ دِيَةُ النَّفْسِ عِوَضًا عن الرُّوحِ، وليستِ الأطْرافُ بعضَها، بخلافِ مَسْألتِنا هذه. ذكَره القاضي. ويَحْتَمِلُ كلامُ الْخِرَقِيِّ أن يَخْتَصَّ امْتناعُ الزِّيادةِ بالرأسِ والوَجْهِ؛ لقوله: إلَّا أنْ تكونَ الجنايةُ في رأسٍ أو وَجْهٍ، فلا يُجاوَزُ به أرشُ المُوَقَّتِ.
فصل: وإذا أخْرجَتِ الحُكومةُ في شِجاج الرَّأْسِ التي دُونَ المُوضِحَةِ قَدْرَ أرْشِ المُوضِحَةِ، أو زيادةً عليه، فظاهرُ كلامِ الْخِرَقِيِّ أنَّه يجبُ أرشُ المُوضِحَةِ. وقال القاضي: يجبُ أن تَنْقُصَ عنها شيئًا، على حسَبِ ما يُؤَدِّى إليه الاجتهادُ. وهذا مذهبُ الشَّافعيِّ؛ لئلَّا يجبَ في بعضِها ما يجبُ في جميعِها. ووَجْهُ قولِ الْخِرَقِيِّ، أنَّ مُقْتَضَى الدَّليلِ وُجوبُ ما أخْرَجتْهُ الحُكومةُ، وإنَّما سقَطَ الزَّائدُ على أرْشِ المُوضِحَةِ؛ لمُخالَفتِه النَّصَّ (٢)، أو تَنْبِيهَ النَّصِّ، ففِيما لم يَزدْ، يجبُ البَقاءُ على الأصل، ولأنَّ ما ثَبتَ بالتَّنْبِيهِ، يجوزُ أنْ يُساوِيَ المَنْصُوصَ عليه في الحُكْمِ، ولا يَلْزَمُ أَنْ يَزِيدَ عليه، كما أنَّه لمَّا نَصَّ على وُجوبِ فِدْيةِ الأذَى في حقِّ الْمَعْذورِ، لمْ (٣) تَلْزَمْ زيادتُها في حَقِّ مَن (٤) لا عُذْرَ له، ولا يَمْتَنِعُ أنْ يجبَ في البَعْضِ ما يجبُ في الكُلِّ، بدليلِ وُجوبِ دِيَةِ الأصابعِ؛ مثلَ دِيَةِ الْيَدِ كلِّها، وفي حَشَفَة الذَّكَرِ مثلُ ما في جميعِه. فإنْ قِيل: هذا وجَبَ بالتَّقْديرِ الشَّرْعِيِّ، لا بالتَّقْويمِ. قُلْنا: إذا ثَبتَ الحُكْمُ بنَصِّ الشَّارعِ، لم يَمْتَنِعْ ثُبوتُ مِثْلِه بالقياسِ عليه، والاجتهادِ المُؤدِّي إليه. وفي الجملةِ، فالحُكومةُ دليلُ تَرْكِ العملِ بها في الزَّائدِ لمعنًى مَفْقودٍ في المُسَاوِي، فيجبُ العملُ فيه بها لِعَدَمِ المُعارِضِ ثَمَّ، وإنْ صحَّ ما
(٢) في ب: "بالنص".(٣) في م: "ولم".(٤) سقط من: م.