If he judges that liability is dropped from the people of rebellion regarding what they destroyed during the state of war, his judgment is permissible because it is a matter of ijtihad (legal reasoning). If his judgment concerns what they destroyed before the onset of war, it is not effective because it violates consensus. If he judges against the people of justice for the obligation of liability for what they destroyed during the state of war, his judgment is not effective because of his violation (4) of consensus (5). If he judges for the obligation of liability for what they destroyed outside the state of war, his judgment is effective. If their judge writes to the judge of the people of justice, it is permissible to accept his document, because he is a judge with established cases and effective judgments. It is better not to accept it, in order to soften their hearts. The proponents of reason (ahl al-ra'y) said: He shall not accept it, because his judicial authority is not permissible. Discussion regarding this has already preceded. As for the Kharijites, if they appoint a judge, his judgment is not permissible, because the least of their conditions is sinfulness (fisq), and sinfulness contradicts judicial authority. It is possible that his judgment is valid and his decisions are effective, because this is something that extends over a long duration, and there is great harm in judging the corruption of his judgments, contracts, marriages, and other things. Thus, it is permissible to avoid harm, just as if he established the penal codes (hudud) and collected (6) the jizya, the kharaj, and the Zakat.
Section: If the people of rebellion commit acts that require a prescribed penalty (hadd) while in their state of resistance, and they are subsequently captured, the prescribed penalties of Allah the Almighty shall be carried out upon them, [because the prescribed penalties of Allah the Almighty do not] (7) lapse due to the difference in territory. This is the opinion of Malik, al-Shafi'i, and Ibn al-Mundhir. Abu Hanifa said: If they resist in a territory, the prescribed penalty is not incumbent upon any of them, nor upon any merchant or captive among them, because they have exited the territory of the Imam, so they resemble those who are in the territory of war (dar al-harb). Our position is the generality of the verses and the reports, and because every place in which acts of worship are incumbent at their appointed times, the prescribed penalties are also incumbent therein when their causes are present, just like the territory of the people of justice. Furthermore, he is an adulterer or a thief, and there is no ambiguity regarding his adultery or theft; therefore, the penalty is incumbent upon him, just like one who is in the territory of justice. We say the same regarding one who commits a crime requiring a penalty in the territory of war; it is incumbent upon him, but it shall not be carried out except in the territory of Islam, according to what we have mentioned in its proper place.
(4) In [B]: "li-mukhalafat". (5) In [M]: "lil-ijma'". (6) In [M]: "wa-akhadha". (7) In [M]: "wa-la".
بسُقوطِ الضَّمانِ عن أهْلِ البَغْيِ فيما أتْلَفُوه حالَ الحَرْبِ، جازَ حكمُه؛ لأنَّه مَوْضِعُ اجْتِهَادٍ. وإن كان حكمُه فيما أتلَفُوه قبلَ قيامِ الحَرْبِ، لم يَنْفُذْ؛ لأنَّه مُخَالِفٌ للإِجْماعِ. وإن حَكَمَ على أَهْلِ العَدْلِ بِوُجُوبِ الضَّمَانِ فيما أَتْلَفُوه حالَ الحرْبِ، لم يَنْفُذْ حُكْمُه؛ لمُخَالَفَتِه (٤) الإِجْماعَ (٥). وإن حَكَمَ بِوجُوبِ ضَمَانِ ما أتْلَفُوه في غيرِ حالِ الحَرْبِ، نَفَذَ حُكْمُه. وإن كَتَبَ قَاضِيهِم إلى قَاضِى أهْلِ الْعَدْلِ، جازَ قَبُولُ كتابِه؛ لأنَّه قَاضٍ ثَابِتُ القضايا، نَافِذُ الأحْكَامِ. والأَوْلَى أنْ لا يَقْبَلَه، كَسْرًا لِقُلُوبِهِم. وقال أصْحابُ الرَّأْيِ: لَا يَقْبَلُهُ؛ لأنَّ قَضاءَه لا يجوزُ. وقد سبقَ الكلامُ في هذا. فأمَّا الخَوارِجُ إذا وَلَّوا قَاضِيًا، لم يَجُزْ قضاؤُهُ؛ لأَنَّ أَقَلَّ أَحْوَالِهم الفِسْقُ، والفِسْقُ يُنَافِى القَضاءَ. ويَحْتَمِلُ أنْ يَصِحَّ قضاؤُه، وتَنْفُذَ أحْكامُه؛ لأَنَّ هذا مِمَّا يَتَطَاوَلُ، وفي القضاءِ بِفسادِ قضاياه وعقودِه الأَنْكِحَةِ وغَيْرها ضَرَرٌ كَثِيرٌ، فجازَ دَفْعًا للضَّرَرِ، كما لو أَقام الحُدُودَ، وأَخَذَ (٦) الجِزْيَةَ والخَراجَ والزَّكاةَ.
فصل: وإنِ ارْتَكَبَ أهْلُ البَغْى في حالِ امْتِنَاعِهم ما يُوجِبُ الحَدَّ، ثم قُدِرَ عليهم، أُقِيمَتْ فِيهم حُدُودُ اللهِ تعالى، [لأنَّ حُدودَ اللهِ تعالى لا] (٧) تَسْقُطُ بِاخْتِلَافِ الدَّارِ. وبهذا قال مالكٌ، والشَّافِعِيُّ، وابن المُنْذِرِ. وقال أبو حنيفَةَ: إذا امْتَنَعُوا بِدَارٍ، لم يَجِبِ الحَدُّ على أحَدٍ منهم، ولا على مَنْ عِنْدَهم من تاجِرٍ أو أَسِيرٍ؛ لأنَّهم خَارِجون عن دارِ الإِمامِ، فأشْبَهُوا مَنْ في دارِ الْحَرْبِ. ولَنا، عُمومُ الآياتِ والأخْبَارِ؛ ولأنَّ كُلَّ مَوْضِعٍ تَجِبُ فيه العِباداتُ في أوقاتِها، تَجِبُ الحُدُودُ فيه. عند وُجُودِ أَسْبابِها، كدارِ أَهْلِ العَدْلِ؛ ولأنَّه زَانٍ أو سارقٌ، لا شُبْهَةَ في زِنَاهُ وسَرِقَتِه، فَوَجَبَ عليه الحَدُّ، كالَّذِي في دارِ العَدْلِ. وهكذا نقولُ في مَن أتَى حَدًّا في دارِ الحَرْبِ، فإنَّه يَجِبُ عليه، لكنْ لا يُقامُ إلَّا في دارِ الإِسلامِ، على ما ذَكرْناه في مَوْضِعِه.
(٤) في ب: "لمخالفة".(٥) في م: "للإجماع".(٦) في م: "وأخذ".(٧) في م: "ولا".