and he perishes thereby, the Qadi and the companions of al-Shafi'i stated: The ruler is liable for his death, because he is obligated to obey his leader, so when his obedience leads to death, it is as if he was compelled into it. If the one commanding it was someone other than the Imam, he would not be liable, because obedience to him is not mandatory, so he did not compel him to it. If the ruler commands him to go on an errand and he trips and perishes, he is not liable for him because walking is not the cause of death in the vast majority of cases, unlike what we mentioned initially. According to this, if his command—which necessitates liability—was for the interest of the Muslims, then the liability is on the Public Treasury (bayt al-mal). If it was for his own personal interest, the liability is upon him or upon his 'aqila (male paternal relatives), if it is from the category that his 'aqila would bear. If the Imam executes a prescribed punishment (hadd) in extreme heat or cold, or compels a person to be circumcised in such conditions, does he incur liability for what perishes? There are two possibilities.
1610- Issue: He said: (And if a wild camel attacks him, and he is unable to fend it off except by striking it, so he strikes it and kills it, he incurs no liability.)
The summary of this is that if an animal attacks a person, and it is not possible for him to repel it except by killing it, it is permissible for him to kill it by consensus, and he is not liable for it if it belongs to someone else. This is the view of Malik, al-Shafi'i, and Ishaq. Abu Hanifa and his companions said: He is liable for it, because he destroyed the property of another to preserve his own life, so he is liable for it, just like one who is in a state of necessity (mudtar) regarding another's food and eats it. They said the same regarding a non-competent human, such as a child or an insane person: it is permissible to kill him, and he is liable for him because he does not possess the right to permit his own blood; that is why if he apostatizes, he is not killed. Our view is that he killed it through permissible self-defense, so he is not liable for it, like the slave. Furthermore, it is an animal whose destruction is permitted, so he is not liable for it, just like a competent human. Additionally, (1) he killed it to repel its evil, so it resembles the slave; this is because when he kills it to repel its evil, the attacker is the one who killed himself, so it is like someone who sets up a spear in his path, then throws himself upon it and dies because of it. It is distinct from the person in necessity; for the food did not compel him to destroy it, and no action originated from it that would remove its sanctity. That is why if a person in ihram kills game because it attacked him, he is not liable, whereas if he killed it because he was in necessity for it, he would be liable. If he kills a competent person because he attacked him, he is not liable,
(1) The waw was omitted from [the manuscript] Original.
فعَطِب به، فقال القاضي، وأصحابُ الشَّافِعِىِّ: على السُّلطانِ ضَمانُه؛ لأنَّ عليه طاعَةَ إمامِه، فإذا أفْضَتْ طاعتُه إلى الهلاكِ، فكأنَّه ألْجأَه إليه. ولو كانَ الآمِرُ غيرَ الإِمامِ، لم يَضْمَنْ؛ لأنَّ طاعتَه غيرُ لازمَةٍ، فلم يُلْجِئْه إليه. وإن أمرَه السُّلطانُ بالمُضِىِّ في حاجَةٍ، فعَثَرَ فَهَلَكَ، لم يَضْمَنْه؛ لأنَّ المشْىَ ليس بسببِ الهلاكِ في الأعَمِّ الأغْلَبِ، بخلافِ ما ذكرْناه أوَّلًا. فعلى هذا، إن كان أمرُه الموجِبُ للضَّمانِ لمصلحةِ المسلمين، فالضمانُ في بيتِ المالِ، وإن كان لمصلحةِ نَفْسِه، فالضَّمَانُ عليه، أو على عاقلَتِه، إن كان ممَّا تَحْمِلُه عاقلَتُه. وإن أقامَ الإِمامُ الحَدَّ في شدَّةِ حَرٍّ أو بَرْدٍ، أو ألْزَمَ إنسانًا الخِتانَ في ذلك، فهل يَضْمَنُ ما تَلِفَ؟ يَحْتَمِلُ وَجْهين.
١٦١٠ - مسألة؛ قال: (وَإِذَا حَمَلَ عَلَيْهِ جَمَلٌ صَائِلٌ، فَلَمْ يَقْدِرْ عَلَى الِامْتِنَاعِ مِنْهُ إلَّا بِضَرْبِهِ، فَضَرَبَهُ فَقَتَلَهُ، فَلَا ضَمَانَ عَلَيْهِ).
وجملتُه أنَّ الإِنسانَ إذا صالَتْ عليه بَهيمةٌ، فلم يُمْكِنْهُ دَفْعُها إلَّا بقَتْلِها، جازَ له قَتْلُها إجْماعًا، وليس عليه ضَمَانُها إذا كانتْ لغيرِه. وبهذا قال مالِكٌ، والشَّافِعِىُّ، وإسْحاقُ. وقال أبو حنيفةَ وأصْحابُه: عليه ضَمانُها؛ لأنَّه أَتْلَفَ مالَ غيرِه لإِحْياءِ نفسِه، فكان عليه ضَمانُه، كالمُضْطَرِّ إلى طَعامِ غيرِه إذا أكلَه. وكذلك قالوا في غيرِ المُكلَّفِ من الآدَمِيِّين، كالصَّبِىِّ والمجنونِ: يجوزُ قتلُه، ويضْمَنُه؛ لأنَّه لا يملِكُ إباحَةَ نفسِه، ولذلك لو ارْتَدَّ، لم يُقْتَلْ. ولَنا، أنَّه قتلَه بالدَّفْعِ الجائِزِ، فلم يَضْمَنْه، كالعبدِ، ولأنَّه حيوانٌ، جازَ إتلافُه، فلم يَضْمَنْه، كالآدَمِىِّ المُكلَّفِ، ولأنَّه (١) قتلَه لدفعِ شَرِّهِ، فأشْبَهَ العَبْدَ؛ وذلك لأنَّه إذا قتلَه لدَفْعِ شَرِّه، كان الصائِلُ هو القاتلُ لنفسِه، فأشْبَهَ ما لو نَصَبَ حَرْبَةً في طريقِه، فَقَذَفَ نفسَه عليها، فماتَ بها. وفارقَ المُضْطَرَ؛ فإنَّ الطَّعَامَ لم يُلْجِئْهُ إلى إتْلافِه، ولم يَصْدُرْ منه ما يُزِيلُ عِصْمَتَه، ولهذا لو قَتَلَ المُحْرِمُ صيدًا لصِيَالِه لم يَضْمَنْه، ولو قتلَه لاضْطرارِه إليه، ضَمِنَه، ولو قَتَلَ المكلَّفَ لصِيَالِه، لم يَضْمَنْه،
(١) سقطت الواو من: الأصل.