He said in it: "Expiate your oath, and manumit your slave girl." This is an addition that must be accepted. It is also possible that she had no slave other than her.

Section: As for if he says: "If I do such and such, then it is incumbent upon me to Allah to manumit my slave, or set him free," or something similar, he does not manumit him upon breaking the oath, and he performs the expiation for an oath, according to what we mentioned regarding the vow of lajjaj (the vow of insistence/anger); because he did not attach the manumission, he merely swore upon attaching the manumission to a condition, unlike the one before it.

Section: And when he breaks his oath, his slaves, female slaves, mudabbar (post-mortem emancipated) slaves, mothers of children, mukatab (contracted) slaves, and the shares he owns of slaves and female slaves are emancipated. This is the opinion of Abu Thawr, al-Muzani, and Ibn al-Mundhir. From Ahmad, there is another narration: the share (shiqs) is not emancipated unless he intends it. Perhaps he held the view that the term "slave" does not apply to a share. Abu Hanifah, his two companions, and Ishaq said: The mukatab slave is not emancipated. This is also the opinion of al-Shafi'i; because he is outside his master's possession and control, so he does not enter into the name of his slaves, like a free person. Al-Rabi' said: I heard from al-Shafi'i that he is emancipated. Our argument is that he is his owned slave, so he is emancipated, like the mudabbar slave. The evidence for him being his owned slave is his (peace be upon him) statement: "The mukatab is a slave as long as a dirham remains upon him." And his saying to 'A'ishah: "Buy Barirah and manumit her." She was a mukatabah, and it is not valid to purchase one who is not a slave, nor to manumit them. And because his manumission is valid by consensus, and his rulings are the rulings of slaves, and because he is a slave, he must have a master, and because his manumission is valid by direct action, he enters into manumission by attachment, like the rest of his slaves. As for the share (shiqs), it is owned by him and is capable of being set free, so it enters into the generality of his wording.

Section: If he says: "The slave of so-and-so is free, if I enter the house," then he enters it, the slave is not emancipated, without disagreement; because he would not be emancipated by his manumission if it were immediate, so he is certainly not emancipated by attachment. Is he then liable for an expiation?