and Al-Shafi'i. Abu Thawr said: It suffices, because he is a human being who is owned, so his emancipation as a slave is valid, like a newborn. Our position is that the rulings of the worldly life have not yet been established for him, for he does not inherit except through legacy and bequest, and being a human being is not a condition for these two, because that status is established for him while he is a drop of fluid or a clot, and he is not a human being in that state. The third condition is that the slave must not have a defect that hinders work. We have explained this in [the chapter on] Zihar. A child suffices even if he is incapable of work, because that state is transient and its possessor is destined for perfection. An insane person does not suffice because his deficiency has no known endpoint for its cessation, so he resembles one chronically ill.

Section: If one emancipates someone who is absent but whose life is known, and reports about him come, it is valid and suffices for the expiation, just like one who is present. If there is doubt regarding his life and news of him has ceased, the sufficiency of the emancipation is not ruled, because the original state is the liability of his debt, and it is not cleared by doubt, and this slave is in doubt [regarding his existence, so there is doubt] regarding his emancipation. If it is said: The original state is his life, we respond: Except that it is known that death is inevitable, and evidence for it has been found, which is the cessation of news about him. If it becomes clear after this that he was alive, we determine the validity of his emancipation and the discharge of the liability for the expiation; otherwise, it does not.

Section: If someone other than the owner emancipates on his behalf without his command, it does not count for the person on whose behalf it was done while he is alive, and the Wala' (patronage rights) belongs to the emancipator, and it does not suffice for his expiation, even if he intended that. This is the opinion of Abu Hanifah and Al-Shafi'i. It is narrated from Malik that if he emancipates for a duty incumbent upon another person without his command, it is valid, because he has fulfilled a duty for him, so it is valid, just as if he had paid a debt for him. Our position is that this is an act of worship for which intention is a condition, so its performance is not valid on behalf of one for whom it became obligatory without his command, despite him being among those capable of commanding, such as Hajj, and because it is one of the components of expiation, so it is not valid on behalf of the one who is liable for the expiation without his command, such as fasting.