his wife or his slave, 'that they shall not go out except with my permission,' and the slave is emancipated and the wife is divorced, then they go out without his permission, he does not violate the oath; because the circumstantial evidence shifts the ruling of the statement to itself, and he only possesses the right to forbid the wife and slave while he has authority over them, so it is as if he said, 'As long as you both are under my ownership.' And because the cause indicates the intention in specificity, just as it indicates it in generality. If he had intended specificity, his oath would be restricted to it; likewise is the case when there is that which indicates it. If he swears to an agent, 'You shall not go out except with my permission,' and then the agent is dismissed, or if he swears, 'You shall not see a wrong without reporting it to so-and-so, the judge,' and then the judge is dismissed, there are two views regarding this, based on what has preceded. One of them is that the oath is not dissolved by his dismissal. The Qadi said: 'This is the analogy of the school, because if the oath is attached to a described entity, it is attached to the entity even if the description changes.' This is one of the two views for the followers of al-Shafi'i. The other view is that the oath is dissolved by his dismissal. This is the school of Abu Hanifa, because it cannot be said: 'He reported it to him' except during the time of his authority. Thus, according to this, if he sees the wrong during the judge's tenure, and it is possible for him to report it but he does not report it until he is dismissed, he does not fulfill his oath by reporting it to him while he is in a state of being dismissed. Does he violate the oath upon his dismissal? There are two views: one of them is that he violates it, because reporting it to him has become impossible, so it is similar to if he had died. The second is that he does not violate it, because the impossibility of it has not been confirmed, due to the possibility that he may hold office again and he then reports it to him; unlike if he died, for he would violate the oath because its impossibility would be confirmed. If he died before it was possible to report it to him, he also violates the oath, because it has become impossible, so it is similar to if he swore to strike his slave tomorrow, and the slave died today. It is also possible that he does not violate it, because he did not have the capacity to perform the act sworn upon, so it is similar to the coerced person. If we say: 'His oath is not dissolved by his dismissal,' then if he reports it to him after his dismissal, he has fulfilled the oath.

Section: If the cause and the intention differ, such as if his wife obligated him by her spinning, and he swore, 'I will not wear a garment made of her spinning,' intending only to avoid the wearing specifically, without avoiding benefiting from its price or other things, the intention is prioritized over the cause in one single view; because the intention accords with the requirement of the wording. If he intended by his oath a single garment, it is the same according to the apparent statement of al-Khiraqi. The Qadi said: 'The cause is prioritized, because the wording is apparent in its generality, and the cause confirms and strengthens that apparent meaning; for the cause is the sense of obligation, and the apparent meaning of the oath is upon him.' If it is said: 'This is a metaphor (majaz) upon which the oath is not predicated,' we say: 'The metaphor, when it becomes well-known, becomes one of the customary names, so the wording, upon being uttered, is diverted to it, like the word for a water-carrier (rawiyah) and the beast (dabbah), and others besides them.'