and its poor quality, it is better. The companions of Al-Shāfiʿī stated something similar, for they said: If it is possible to achieve equality between the two partners in its good and bad quality, such that the good [part] is at its front and the bad [part] is at its back, then when we divide it, each one receives the same amount of good and bad as the other, the division becomes mandatory, and the one who refuses shall be compelled to it. If the division is not possible in this manner, such that the building or the trees and the good [part] cannot be divided alone, but balancing it by value is possible, it is balanced by value, and the one who refuses [to divide] shall be compelled to it. Al-Shāfiʿī said, in one of the two opinions: The one who refuses to divide it shall not be compelled. [They said: If the land is thirty jarīb, and the value of ten jarībs of it is equal to the value of twenty, the one who refuses to divide it shall not be compelled]; due to the impossibility of equality in the crops, and because if there were two adjacent fields, the one who refuses would not be compelled to divide it if it were only possible by making each of them a share, and likewise here. Our argument is that it is a single place whose division and balancing are possible without giving compensation or causing harm, so its division is mandatory, like houses. [It is also] because what they mentioned leads to prohibiting the obligation of division in all orchards and houses; for it is not possible for trees, house buildings, and their dwellings to be equal except by value, and because it is a place that, if part of it were sold, preemption (shufʿah) would be mandatory for the seller’s partner, so its division is mandatory, just as if equality by crops were possible. As for when there are two orchards, each of which has a path, or two fields, or two houses, or two shops that are adjacent or distant, and one of the partners requests their division by making each one of them shared between them, the other shall not be compelled to this, whether they are equal or different. This is the manifest position of the school of Al-Shāfiʿī; because they are two distinct things; if one of them were sold, preemption would not be mandatory for the owner of the other, unlike a single orchard or a single piece of land, even if it is large, for it