the state of one who is present, regarding the license [to shorten prayer] and otherwise, unlike the distance of shortening prayer. This condition is considered valid continuously until the judgment is rendered. Thus, if the secondary witnesses testified, and judgment was not passed based on their testimony until the original witnesses arrived, then the judgment would be suspended until their testimony is heard; because he was able to obtain the original testimony before acting upon the substitute, so it is not permissible to act upon it, just like a person performing tayammum (dry ablution) who gains access to water before the prayer. Furthermore, because if their presence occurred before the secondary testimony was performed, it would prevent it, so if it occurs before the judgment, it prevents it as well, similar to the case of moral turpitude (fisq).

The second condition is that the conditions of testimony—such as integrity and others—must be fulfilled in every one of the original and secondary witnesses, in the manner we have mentioned, because the judgment is built upon both testimonies together; thus, the conditions were considered for each one of them. We know of no disagreement regarding this. If the secondary witnesses confirm the integrity of the original witnesses, testifying to their integrity and to their testimony, it is permissible without any disagreement that we know of. If they do not testify to their integrity, it is still permissible, and the judge handles that; if he knows their integrity, he renders judgment, and if he does not know it, he investigates it. This is the opinion of al-Shafi'i. Al-Thawri and Abu Yusuf said: If the secondary witnesses do not confirm the integrity of the original witnesses, the judge shall not hear their testimony, because the omission of their confirmation makes the judge suspicious. This is not correct; for it is possible that they do not know that, so it is referred back to the investigation of the judge. It is also possible that they do know their integrity but omit it, considering the investigation of their integrity that is established before the judge to be sufficient. This condition must be maintained, and the integrity must exist in all of them until the conclusion of the judgment, for the reasons we mentioned regarding the original witness before this. If the witnesses of the original or secondary testimony die, it does not prevent the judgment. Likewise, if the original witnesses die before the secondary ones perform their testimony, it does not prevent them from performing it, or from judgment being based upon it, because their death is a condition for the hearing of the secondary testimony and the judgment, so it is not permissible to make it a preventive factor. The same applies if they become insane, because their insanity is equivalent to their death.

The third condition is that they must specify the two original witnesses and name them. Ibn Jarir said: If they say, "two males, free, upright," it is permissible even if they do not name them, because the purpose is to know the attributes, not the identity. This is not correct, because it is possible that they are upright in their estimation but deemed disreputable by others, and because the one against whom the testimony is given might be able to challenge the witnesses; if he does not know their identities, that becomes impossible for him.