The fourth condition is that the original witness must solicit the testimony, saying: "Bear witness to my testimony that I testify that so-and-so owes so-and-so such-and-such," or "He acknowledged such-and-such in my presence." Or, if he hears a witness soliciting another to bear testimony that he calls him to witness, it is permissible for this listener to testify by it due to the occurrence of the solicitation. It is possible that it is not permissible for him to testify unless he specifically solicited him, which is the opinion of Abu Hanifa. Ahmad said: "It is not a testimony unless he calls upon you to witness; as for hearing him speaking [generally], that is merely a conversation." Al-Shafi'i, the scholars of opinion (Ashab al-Ra'y), and Abu 'Ubayd held the view we mentioned.
As for if he hears a witness testifying before the judge regarding a right, or hears him testify to a right while attributing it to a cause—for example, saying: "I testify that so-and-so owes so-and-so one thousand [dirhams] from the price of a sold item"—may he testify based on it? Abu al-Khattab said: "There are two narrations regarding this." The Qadi mentioned that he is permitted to testify by it. This is the school of al-Shafi'i, because by testifying before the judge and attributing the right to its cause, the ambiguity is removed and the difficulty is resolved; thus, it is permissible for him to testify to his testimony, just as if he had solicited him. The other narration is that it is not permissible for him to testify to his testimony. This is the opinion of Abu Hanifa and Abu 'Ubayd, because testimony upon testimony contains the meaning of agency, and one cannot act as an agent except by his permission. Those who defended the first view said: "This person is relaying his testimony, not acting as an agent for him, because he is not testifying like his testimony; he is merely testifying to his testimony."
As for if he says: "Bear witness that I testify against so-and-so for such-and-such," it is more likely that it is permissible to testify to his testimony. This is the opinion of Abu Yusuf, because the meaning of that is: "Bear witness to my testimony." Abu Hanifa said: "It is not permissible unless he says: 'Bear witness to my testimony that I testify.'" This is because if he says: "Bear witness," he has commanded him to testify but has not solicited him [specifically for the secondary testimony]. Outside of these instances, it is not permissible to testify upon testimony. Thus, if he hears him saying: "I testify that so-and-so owes so-and-so one thousand dirhams," it is not permissible to testify to his testimony, because he did not solicit him to testify, and it is possible that he had only promised him to do so. A promise may be metaphorically described as an obligation, for the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said: "A promise is a debt." It is also possible that he intended by the testimony...
(16) Omitted from B. (17) In M: "sami'a" (heard). (18) In A: "al-haqq" (the right). (19) Omitted from B. [He] transferred the scholarly view. (20) Recorded by al-Daylami and Ibn 'Asakir. See: Al-Jami' al-Kabir 1/430.
الشَّرْط الرابع، أن يَسْتَرْعِيَه شاهدُ الأَصْلِ الشَّهادةَ (١٦)، فيقولَ: اشْهَدْ على شَهادتى أنِّى أشْهَدُ أَنَّ لفُلانٍ على فلانٍ كذا، أو أقَرَّ عندى بكذا. أو يَسْمَعَ (١٧) شاهدًا يَسْتَرْعِى آخَرَ شَهادةً يُشْهِدُه عليها، فيجوزُ لهذا السَّامعِ أن يَشْهَد بها؛ لحُصولِ الاسْتِرْعاءِ، ويَحْتَمِلُ أن لا يجوزَ له أن يَشْهَدَ إِلَّا أن يَسْتَرْعِيَه بعَيْنِه. وهو قولُ أبى حنيفةَ. قال أحمدُ: لا تَكونُ شَهادةً إِلَّا أن يُشْهِدَكَ، فأمَّا إذا سَمِعْتَه يَتحدَّثُ، فإنَّما ذلك حَدِيث. وبما ذكَرْناه قال الشَّافعىُّ، وأصْحابُ الرَّأْىِ، وأبو عُبَيْدٍ. فأمَّا إن سمِعَ شاهِدًا يشْهَدُ عندَ الحاكِم بحَقٍّ، أو سَمِعَه يَشْهَدُ بحَقٍّ يَعْزِيه إلى سَبَبٍ، نحو أن يقولَ: أشْهَدُ أَنَّ لفُلانٍ على فُلانٍ ألفًا مِن ثمنِ مَبِيعٍ. فهل يَشْهَدُ به؟ . قال أبو الخَطَّابِ: فيه رِوَايتانِ. وذكرَ القاضى، أَنَّ له الشَّهادةَ به. وهو مذهبُ الشَّافعىِّ؛ لأَنَّه بالشَّهادةِ عندَ الحاكمِ، ونِسْبَتِه للحقِّ (١٨) إلى سَبَبِه، يَزولُ الاحْتِمالُ، ويَرْتَفِعُ الإِشْكالُ، فتجوزُ له الشَّهادةُ على شَهادتِه، كما لو اسْتَرْعاه. والرِّوايةُ الأُخْرَى، لا يجوزُ أن يَشْهدَ على شَهادتِه. وهو قولُ أبى حنيفةَ، وأبى عُبَيْدٍ؛ لأنَّ الشَّهادةَ على الشَّهادةِ فيها معنَى النِّيابةِ، فلا يَنُوبُ عنه إِلَّا بإذْنِه. ومَن نصرَ الأوَّلَ قال: هذا يَنْقُلُ شَهادتَه، ولا يَنُوبُ عنه؛ لأَنَّه لا يَشْهدُ مِثلَ شهادتِه، وإنَّما يَشْهدُ على شَهادتِه. فأمَّا إن قالَ: اشْهَدْ أنِّى أشْهَدُ على فُلانٍ بكذا. فالأشْبَهُ أن يجوزَ أن يَشْهَدَ على شَهادتِه. وهذا قولُ أبى يوسفَ؛ لأنَّ معنَى ذلك: اشْهَدْ على شَهادتِى. [وقالَ أبو حَنيفةَ: لا يجوزُ إِلَّا أَنْ يَقولَ: اشْهَدْ على شَهادتِى] (١٩) أنِّى أَشْهَدُ. لأَنَّه إذا قال: اشْهَدْ. فقد أمرَه بالشَّهادةِ، ولم يَسْتَرْعِه. وما عَدا هذه المَواضِعَ، لا يجوزُ أن يشْهدَ فيها على الشَّهادةِ، فإذا سَمِعَه يقولُ: أشْهَدُ أَنَّ لفُلانٍ على فُلانٍ ألفَ دِرهمٍ. لم يَجُزْ أن يَشْهدَ على شَهادتِه؛ لأَنَّه لم يَسْتَرْعِه الشَّهادةَ، فيَحْتَمِلُ أن يكونَ وَعَدَه بها. وقد يُوصَفُ الوَعْدُ بالوجوبِ مَجازًا؛ فإِنَّ النَّبِىَّ -صلى اللَّه عليه وسلم- قال: "الْعِدَةُ دَيْنٌ" (٢٠). ويَحْتَمِلُ أن يُريدَ بالشَّهادةِ
(١٦) سقط من: ب.(١٧) فى م: "سمع".(١٨) فى أ: "الحق".(١٩) سقط من: ب. نقل نظر.(٢٠) أخرجه الديلمى وابن عساكر. انظر: الجامع الكبير ١/ ٤٣٠.