by the word of divorce, like the other, or the expression established for removing one of them becomes an implicit expression for removing the other, like freedom for removing marriage. This is because it contains the meaning of releasing; therefore, if he intends by it the release of her from his ownership, he has intended by his expression what it allows, so freedom is attained, just like other implicit expressions of emancipation.

Section: If he says to one older than himself, or to one whose equal would not be born to him: "This is my son"—for example, if a twenty-year-old says to a fifteen-year-old, "This is my son"—he is not emancipated, and his lineage is not established. Abu Hanifah said: He is emancipated. Abu al-Khattab derived this as an opinion in our school, because he confessed that which establishes his freedom, so it is similar to if he had acknowledged it. Our argument is that it is a statement in which his lying is manifest, so freedom is not established by it, just as if he said to a child, "This is my father," or to a female child, "This is my mother." Ibn al-Mundhir said: This opinion of al-Nu'man (Abu Hanifah) is anomalous; no one preceded him in it, nor did anyone follow him, and it is impossible speech and certainly a lie. If this were permissible, it would be permissible for a man to say to a child, "This is my father." Furthermore, if he said to his wife, who is older than him, "This is my daughter," or said to her while he is older than her, "This is my mother," she would not be divorced; likewise is this case.

Section: If he says to his slave-woman, "You are forbidden to me," intending emancipation by it, she is emancipated. Abu al-Khattab mentioned that there is another narration regarding it, that she is not emancipated, like his saying to her, "You are divorced." The correct view is that she is emancipated by it, because it allows for the meaning: "You are forbidden to me because you are free." Thus, she is emancipated by it, like his saying: "I have no way over you."

Section: Emancipation is valid from anyone who is permitted to dispose of wealth, namely the sane, adult, and prudent person, whether they are a Muslim, a Dhimmi (protected non-Muslim subject), or a Harbi (a non-Muslim from the land of war). We know of no disagreement in this except from Abu Hanifah and those who agree with him, regarding that the emancipation by a Harbi is not valid, because he does not have absolute ownership, as evidenced by the permissibility of taking it from him, and the absence of his inviolability regarding his person and his wealth. Our argument is that his divorce is valid, so his emancipation is valid, like the Dhimmi. Furthermore, he is an owner, adult, sane, and prudent, so his emancipation is valid, like the Dhimmi. Their statement: "He has no ownership" is not correct; for they have said that they own the wealth of Muslims by force, so it is more appropriate that ownership be established for them in other things.