during his terminal illness. If lots are cast between them, and the lot falls to one, then the emancipator says: I remember that the one to be emancipated is someone else, there are two views: One of them is that the first is returned to slavery, and the one he specified is emancipated, because it became clear to him who the emancipated one is, so he became free instead of the other, just as if lots had not been cast. The second is that they are both emancipated, which is the opinion of al-Layth and the implication of the statement of Ibn Hamid, because the freedom of the first was established by lot, so it does not cease, just like other free persons. Also, because the statement of the emancipator, "I remembered whom I had forgotten," contains an acknowledgment of the freedom of the one he mentioned and an acknowledgment regarding another person, so his acknowledgment against himself is accepted, but it is not accepted against the other. As for when lots are not cast, his statement is accepted; he emancipates whom he specifies, and the other remains in slavery. So if he says: "I emancipated this one," he is emancipated and the rest remain in slavery. If he says: "I emancipated this one, no, rather this one," they are both emancipated, because he acknowledged the emancipation of the first, so it became binding upon him, then he acknowledged the emancipation of the second, so it became binding upon him, and his retraction of his first acknowledgment is not accepted. The ruling is the same regarding the acknowledgment of an heir.

1959- Issue: He said: "And when he owns half a slave, and he designates him for tadbir (post-death emancipation) or emancipates him during his terminal illness, so he is emancipated upon his death, and one-third of his estate suffices for the value of the half belonging to his partner, he is given [his value] and he [the slave] is entirely free," according to one of the two narrations. The other is that only his share is emancipated, even if one-third of his estate bears the value of his partner's share.

The summary of it is that if he owns a share of a slave, and he emancipates him during his terminal illness, or designates him for tadbir, or bequeaths his emancipation, then he dies and one-third of his estate does not suffice for the value of the partner's share, only his share is emancipated, without any disagreement that we know of among the people of knowledge, except for an anomalous opinion or the opinion of one who holds the view of sa'aya (working for freedom). This is because he has nothing of his wealth except the one-third which the value of the share has exhausted, so he remains insolvent, in the position of one who emancipates a share during his health.