in whatever manner he wishes. It is possible that he does not become free until he expresses his wish. This is the view of Abu Yusuf and Muhammad, because the wish necessitates a choice, so it necessitates that he does not become free before his choosing, just as if he had said, "You are free whenever you wish." This is because "how" (kayfa) gives what "whenever" (mata) and "whichever" (ayyu) give, so its ruling is their ruling. Abu al-Khattab mentioned regarding divorce that if he says to his wife, "You are divorced whenever you wish, however you wish, and wherever you wish," she is not divorced until she wishes, so the same applies here.

Section: The suspension of emancipation upon the performance of something is divided into three categories. The first is a suspension upon a pure condition, such as his saying: "If you pay me a thousand, you are free." This is a binding condition that cannot be nullified because he imposed it upon himself willingly, so he does not possess the right to nullify it, just as if he said: "If you enter the house, you are free." If the master and the slave agreed to nullify it, it would not be nullified for that reason. If the master absolves him of the thousand, he does not become free by that, and the condition is not nullified, because he has no right over his financial liability (dhimmah) to absolve him from, as it is a suspension upon a pure condition. If the master dies, the condition is voided because his ownership ceased, so his emancipation cannot take effect upon someone else's property. If his ownership ceases through sale or gift, the condition ceases; if it returns to his ownership, it returns, as we mentioned previously. Whenever the condition is met, he becomes free and does not need a formal declaration of emancipation from the master, because it is the removal of ownership suspended upon a condition, and it is capable of being suspended, so it comes into effect upon the occurrence of the condition, like divorce. What the slave earns before the occurrence of the condition belongs to his master, because there is no contract that prevents his earnings from belonging to his master, except that what the master takes from him is calculated against the thousand he paid; so when his payment is complete, he becomes free, and what remains in his hand belongs to his master. If the one whose emancipation is suspended is a slave girl (amah) and she gives birth, her child does not follow her in one of the two views, because she is a slave (qinn), so it resembles the case where he says: "If you enter the house, you are free." She is not liable for her own value, because it is an emancipation from the master upon a condition, so it resembles the case where he