emancipates her. He does not become free until he pays the thousand in its entirety. The Qadi mentioned that it is part of our established principles that an emancipation suspended upon a condition comes into effect upon the existence of part of it, just as if he said: "You are free if you eat a loaf of bread," and he ate part of it. This is not correct for several reasons: First, that the payment of the thousand is a condition for emancipation, and the conditions of legal rulings are considered as existing only when they are complete for the rulings to be established, and they are negated by their non-existence, as evidenced by all other conditions of legal rulings. Second, that when he suspends it upon a description involving a number, the number is a description within the condition, and whenever he suspends a ruling upon a condition involving a description, it is not established until the description is found, just as if he said to his slave: "If you go out naked, you are free," and he went out clothed, he does not become free; the same applies to the number. Third, that whenever the wording indicates the whole, he does not break the oath by doing only a part of it. Likewise, if he swore: "I will not perform a prayer (salah)," he does not break his oath until he finishes that which is called a prayer. And if he swore: "I will not fast a fast (siyam)," he does not break his oath until he fasts a day. And if he said to his wife: "If you menstruate a menstruation, you are divorced," she is not divorced until she becomes pure from the menstruation. The Qadi has mentioned this problem and its counterparts, and the mention of the thousand here indicates his intention for the performance of the thousand completely. Fourth, we do not concede this principle which he claimed, and [we maintain that] if he said to him: "You are free if you eat a loaf of bread," he does not become free by eating part of it. Rather, when one swears not to do something, and he does part of it, he breaks the oath, according to one narration, in a situation where it is possible to intend the part, and the wording encompasses it, such as one who swears not to pray and then begins the prayer, or not to fast and then begins the fast, or not to drink the water of this vessel and then drinks part of it, and the like. This is because the one beginning the prayer and the fast has already prayed and fasted that portion which he began, and the amount he drank from the vessel is indeed the water of the vessel; the context of his situation necessitates the prohibition of the whole, thus it necessitates abstention from the whole, and when he does part of it, he has not abstained from the whole, so he breaks his oath for that reason. If he swore to do something, he is not absolved except by doing the entirety of it.