dirhams." The other person said: "I accept." The marriage becomes valid, and the dowry is established. The jurists have stated: If he marries her for a thousand [dirhams] for her and a thousand for her father, that is permissible. As for if he says: "I have emancipated you on the condition that you serve me for a year," and he accepts, there are two narrations regarding this, like the one before it. It has been said: If the slave does not accept, he does not become free—this being a single narration. According to this, if the slave accepts, he becomes free immediately, and his service for a year becomes binding upon him. If the master dies before the completion of the year, he may seek recourse from the slave for the value of the remaining service. Al-Shafi'i held this view. Abu Hanifa said: The value of the slave is prorated over the year's service; thus, the portion corresponding to the time that has passed is deducted, and he seeks recourse from him for what remains of his value. Our view is that emancipation is a contract to which rescission does not apply; therefore, if the fulfillment of the substitute becomes impossible, one must revert to its value, similar to Khul' (divorce for consideration) in marriage and settlement (Sulh) in cases of intentional homicide. If he says: "You are free on the condition that you give me a thousand," the correct view is that he does not become free until he accepts, and if he accepts, he becomes free and the thousand becomes binding upon him. If he says: "You are free for a thousand," he does not become free until he accepts, upon which he becomes free and a thousand becomes binding upon him.

Section: If he suspends the emancipation of his slave woman upon a condition while she is pregnant, her child follows her in that, because the child is like a limb of her body. If she gives birth to the child before the condition is met, and then the condition is met, he becomes free, because he is a dependent regarding the condition, resembling his state while [still] in the womb. If she was not pregnant at the time of the suspension, and then the condition is met while she is pregnant, both she and her fetus become free, because the emancipation occurred to her while she was pregnant, so her child follows her, similar to an absolute (unconditional) emancipation. If she becomes pregnant after the suspension and gives birth before the condition is met, and then the condition is met thereafter, the child does not become free, because the condition was not linked to him, neither at the time of the suspension nor at the time of emancipation. There is another view that he follows her in emancipation, by analogy to the child of a Mudabbarah (a slave woman promised freedom upon her master's death). If the condition is nullified due to a sale or death, the child does not become free, because he only follows her in emancipation, not in the condition itself; thus, if it is not found in her, it is not found in him, unlike the child of a Mudabbarah, for he followed her in the Tadbir (the status of being Mudabbarah), so if it was nullified for her, it remained for him.