or at any time you wish after my death, you are free." This is a suspension of emancipation upon a condition after death, and we have already mentioned that it is invalid, and that the position of the Qadi is its validity. According to his position, it is on a deferred basis; so whenever he wishes after his master's death, he becomes free. Whatever earnings he had before he expressed his wish belong to the master's heirs, because he was a slave before that, unlike what is bequeathed, for there are two views regarding his earnings before acceptance: one of them is that it belongs to the legatee because we determined that he owned it from the moment of death, whereas here, ownership is not established before the wish. [It is] one view, because it is emancipation suspended on a condition, so emancipation is not established before the condition. [It is] one view. The Qadi mentioned regarding his statement, "If you wish" or "When you wish, you are free after my death," that it is immediate; so if he wishes during the session, he becomes a mudabbar, and if the wish is delayed beyond the session, it is void, and he does not become a mudabbar by the wish thereafter, based on his statement: "Choose yourself." For the choice stands [valid] for the session, and this is in that same sense. If he said, "If you wish after my death," or "When you wish after my death, you are free," it was also immediate. So whenever he wishes immediately after his master's death, or in the session, he becomes free, and if his wish is delayed beyond the session, freedom is not established in him. It has been mentioned in [the book of] divorce that if he said: "You are divorced if you wish, and your father wishes," and they both wished simultaneously, the divorce takes place, whether they wished immediately or with a delay, or one of them wished immediately and the other with a delay. This is similar to it, so in every issue, it is inferred [by analogy] just like what was mentioned in the other.
Section: If he said to his slave, "If I die, are you free, or not?" or said, "You are free, or are you not free?" he does not become a mudabbar; because this is an inquiry, and he did not decide upon the emancipation, so it is similar to if he had said to his wife, "You are divorced, or are you not?" And we have mentioned that in [the book of] divorce.
Section: And if one of the two partners declares the tadbir of his share, the tadbir does not extend to his partner's share, whether he is solvent
(21) In the original and A: "al-'itq" (the emancipation). (22) Dropped from: A. (23) Previously mentioned in: 10/467, 468. (24) In A: "dhakarahu" (he mentioned it). In B: "dhakarna" (we mentioned). (25) In A: "dhakara" (he mentioned). (26) Previously mentioned in: 10/362, 363.
وقتٍ شِئْتَ بعدَ مَوْتِى، فأنتَ حرٌّ. فهذا تَعْلِيقٌ للعِتْقِ (٢١) على صِفَةٍ بعدَ الموتِ، وقد ذكَرْنا أَنَّه لا يَصِحُّ، وأنَّ قولَ القاضِى صِحَّتُه، فعلى قولِه، يكونُ ذلك على التَّراخِى، فمتى شاءَ بعدَ مَوْتِ سَيِّدِه، عَتَقَ، وما كان له من كَسْبٍ قبل مَشِيئَتِه، فهو لوَرَثةِ سَيِّدِه؛ لأَنَّه عَبْدٌ قبلَ ذلك، بخِلافِ المُوصَى به، فإِنَّ فى كَسْبِه قبلَ القَبُولِ وَجْهَيْنِ؛ أحدُهما، أنَّه يكون للمُوصَى له؛ لأنَّنا تَبَيَّنَّا أنَّه مَلَكَه مِن (٢٢) حينِ الموتِ، وههُنا لا يَثْبُتُ المِلْكُ قبلَ المَشِيئةِ. وَجْهًا واحدًا؛ لأَنَّه عِتْقٌ مُعَلَّقٌ على شَرْطٍ، فلا يَثْبُتُ العِتْقُ قبلَ الشَّرْطِ. وَجْهًا واحدًا. وذكَر القاضى فى قولِه: إذا شِئْتَ، أو إن شِئْتَ، فأنتَ حُرٌّ بعدَ مَوْتِى، أنَّه على الفَوْرِ، فإِنَّ شاء فى المَجْلِسِ صار مُدَبَّرًا، وإن تراخَتِ الْمَشِيئةُ عن المجلسِ، بَطَلَتْ، ولم يَصِرْ مُدَبَّرًا بالْمَشِيئةِ بعدَه، بِناءً على قولِه: اخْتارِى نَفْسَكِ. فإِنَّ الاخْتيارَ يَقِفُ على المجلس، وهذا فى مَعْناه. وإن قال: إن شِئْتَ بعدَ مَوْتِى، أو إذا شِئْتَ بعدَ مَوْتِى، فأنتَ حُرٌّ. كان على الفَوْرِ أيضًا، فمتى شاءَ عَقِيبَ مَوْتِ سَيِّدِه، أو فى المجلسِ، صار حُرًّا، وإن تَراخَتْ مَشِيئَتُه عن المجلس، لم تَثْبُتْ فيه حُرِّيَّةٌ. وقد ذكَرَ فى الطَّلاقِ، أنَّه إذا قال: أنتِ طالِقٌ، إن شئَتِ، وشاءَ أَبُوكِ. فشاءَا معًا، وقَعَ الطَّلاقُ، سَواءٌ شاءَا على الفَوْرِ أو التَّرَاخِى، أو شاءَ أحَدُهما على الفَوْرِ، والآخَرُ على التَّرَاخِى (٢٣)، وهذا مثلُه، فيُخَرَّجُ فى كلِّ مسألةٍ مثلُ (٢٢) ما ذُكِرَ (٢٤) فى الأُخْرَى.
فصل: إذا قال لعبدِه: إذا مِتُّ، فأنتَ حرٌّ، أَوْ لا؟ أو قال: فأنتَ حرٌّ، أو لستَ بحُرٍّ؟ لم يَصِرْ مُدَبَّرًا؛ لأَنَّه اسْتفهامٌ، ولم يَقْطَعْ بالعِتْقِ، فأشْبَهَ ما لو قال لزَوْجَتِه: أنتِ طالِقٌ، أَوْ لا؟ وقد ذكَرْنا (٢٥) ذلك فى الطَّلاقِ (٢٦).
فصل: وإذا دَبَّرَ أَحدُ الشَّرِيكَيْنِ نَصِيبَه، لم يَسْرِ التَّدْبِيرُ إلى نَصِيبِ شَرِيكِه، مُوسِرًا
(٢١) فى الأصل، أ: "العتق".(٢٢) سقط من: أ.(٢٣) تقدم فى: ١٠/ ٤٦٧، ٤٦٨.(٢٤) فى أ: "ذكره". وفى ب: "ذكرنا".(٢٥) فى أ: "ذكر".(٢٦) تقدم فى: ١٠/ ٣٦٢، ٣٦٣.