1970 - Issue: He said: (If he purchases him after that, he returns to the tadbir [post-mortem emancipation].)

The summary of this is that if the master performs tadbir upon his slave, then sells him, then buys him back, his tadbir returns; because he suspended his emancipation upon a condition, and if he sells him then buys him back, the condition returns, just as if he said: "You are free if you enter the house," then he sold him and bought him back. The Qadi mentioned that this is predicated on the view that tadbir is a suspension [of emancipation] upon a condition. There is another narration that it is a bequest (wasiyya), so it is invalidated by the sale and does not return; because if he were to bequeath something then sell it, the bequest would be invalidated and would not return upon his repurchasing it. The school of al-Shafi'i is similar to this, except that he has two opinions regarding the return of the condition after the purchase. The correct view is what al-Khiraqi said, because tadbir consists of the suspension upon a condition, so the ruling of the suspension does not cease due to the existence of the meaning of a bequest within it. Rather, it is a combination of both matters, and it is not impossible for a ruling to exist due to two causes, thus the ruling of both is established for it.

1971 - Issue: He said: (And if he performed tadbir upon him, then said: "I have retracted my tadbir," or "I have annulled it," it is not annulled; because he suspended the emancipation upon a condition. This is in one of the two narrations. The other is that the tadbir is annulled.)

There is a difference of opinion in the narration from Ahmad, may Allah have mercy on him, regarding the invalidation of tadbir by retracting it verbally. The correct view is that it is not invalidated, because he suspended the emancipation upon a condition, so it is not invalidated, just as if he said to his slave: "If you enter the house, you are free." The second [view] is that it is invalidated, because he made it for himself after his death, so it is a bequest, and thus it is permissible to retract it verbally, just as if he bequeathed another slave to him. This is the old opinion of al-Shafi'i. His new opinion is like the first narration, and it is the correct one, because it is the suspension of emancipation upon a condition. It is not correct to say that it is a bequest of him to himself, because he does not own himself; rather, freedom occurs within him, and slavery falls away from him. This is why freedom does not depend on his acceptance or his choice, and it takes effect immediately after death, just as it takes effect after other conditions. Furthermore, it is not impossible for it to combine both matters, thus the ruling of suspension is established regarding the impossibility of retraction, and they both combine in the occurrence of freedom upon death.