as it appears externally. In the hadith of Barirah, it is narrated that she came to Aisha, may Allah be pleased with her, and said: "O Mother of the Believers, I have entered into a kitaba contract with my masters for nine awaq (ounces), one uqiyyah in each year, so help me." Also, because kitaba is derived from al-damm (joining), which is joining one installment [to another], this indicates its need for two installments. The first [view] is more grounded in analogy (aqyas). It is necessary for the installments to be known, and for the amount to be paid in each installment to be known. It is not required that the installments be equal, nor that the amount paid in each installment be equal. So if he says: "I have entered into a kitaba contract with you for a thousand [dirhams] over ten years, you shall pay one hundred at the expiration of each year," or he says: "You shall pay from it one hundred at the expiration of five years, and the remainder at the completion of the ten," or he says: "You shall pay at the end of the first year one hundred, and nine hundred at the expiration of the tenth year," all of this is permissible. If he says: "You shall pay one hundred every year," it is permissible, and the term for each hundred is at the expiration of the year. The explicit view of the Qadi and the companions of al-Shafi'i is that it is not valid, because the specific time of payment within the year is not clarified. Our argument is that Barirah said: "I have entered into a kitaba contract with my masters for nine awaq, one uqiyyah in each year." Also, when a time limit is linked to a duration, it attaches to one of its two endpoints; if it is with the particle "ila" (until), it attaches to its beginning, such as his saying: "until the month of Ramadan." If it is with the particle "fi" (in), it is until its end, because he made the entirety of it a time for its payment. So if he pays at its end, he is paying it at its prescribed time, and he is not required to pay before that, just like the performance of prayer at the end of its time. If he says: "You shall pay it in ten years," or "until ten years," it is not permissible, because it is [regarded as] a single installment. Whoever permits kitaba on a single installment permits this. If he says: "You shall pay some of it in half of the period, and the remainder at its end," it is not permissible, because the portion is unknown, as it could apply to a small or large amount.

Chapter Two: If he enters into a kitaba contract with him over known installments, the kitaba is valid, and he becomes free upon paying them, whether he intended freedom by the kitaba or did not intend it, and whether he said: "If you pay to me, you are free," or did not say it. Abu Hanifah held this view. Al-Shafi'i said: He does not become free until he says: "If you pay to me, you are free," or intends freedom by the kitaba. It is possible within our school to hold such a view, because the term "kitaba" can imply a mere financial arrangement (mukharajah) or it can imply manumission upon payment, so one must be distinguished from the other, like the metonymies (kinayat) of manumission. Our argument is that freedom is the consequence of the kitaba contract, so it is established upon its completion, like all its other legal rulings. Also, kitaba is a contract established for the purpose of manumission, so it does not require the explicit word of manumission or the intent for it, like tadbir. As for what they mentioned regarding the use of kitaba for a financial arrangement, if that is established, it is not well-known, so it does not prevent the occurrence of freedom through it, just like other explicit terms. Furthermore, a term that is open to interpretation is directed by context to one of its two possibilities, just like the term "tadbir," [for it could imply the planning] of his livelihood or otherwise, yet it is explicit regarding freedom; therefore, it is more appropriate here.