He does not accept the testimony of anyone except the ones who were asked, and he tasks two of them to testify to the uprightness or corruption before him, according to the conditions of testimony in wording and other aspects. It is not accepted from the investigator, because that would be testimony upon testimony while the original witnesses are present. The basis for the first opinion is that the testimony of the investigators is testimony of notoriety (istifada), not testimony upon testimony; therefore, it suffices to have those who testify to it, like all other testimonies of notoriety. Furthermore, it is a matter of necessity, for it is not required for the certifier (muzakki) to be present for the attestation, and the judge does not have the power to compel him to do so; thus, it becomes like illness or absence in all other testimonies. Additionally, if we did not suffice with the testimony of the investigators, the attestation would be impossible, because it might happen that there is no one among the neighbors of the witness whom the judge knows; therefore, he would not accept his word, and the attestation and the report of corruption would be lost.
Section: The judge said: One must have knowledge of the witness's Islam, and this is achieved through one of four ways: First, his own report that he is a Muslim, or his bringing the declaration of Islam, which is the testimony that there is no god but Allah and that Muhammad is His servant and messenger, because if he were not a Muslim, he would become one by that. Second, the acknowledgement of the one against whom testimony is given of his Islam, because that is a right upon him. Third, the knowledge of the judge, because we have sufficed with that for his uprightness, so it is the same for his Islam. Fourth, evidence that establishes it. One must also have knowledge of the status of being a free man in a case where it is considered, and for this, one of three things suffices: evidence, the acknowledgement of the one against whom testimony is given, or the knowledge of the judge. The acknowledgement of the witness does not suffice, because he does not possess the capacity to become a free man, so he does not possess the capacity to affirm it, unlike the case of Islam.
Section: If an unknown person testifies before the judge, and the one against whom testimony is given says: "He is upright," there are two views regarding this. First, it is binding upon the judge to rule based on his testimony, because the investigation into his uprightness is for the sake of the one against whom testimony is given, and he has already acknowledged it. Furthermore, when he affirms his uprightness, he has affirmed that which necessitates the ruling for his adversary against him, so he is bound by his acknowledgement, just like all his other acknowledgements. Second, it is not permissible to rule based on his testimony, because ruling upon it constitutes an attestation of him, and this cannot be established by a single word. Furthermore, the consideration of uprightness in a witness is a right of Allah the Exalted; that is why if the adversary were to agree to be judged against based on the word of a corrupt person, it would not be permissible to rule based on it. Also, because he inevitably must either...
(21) In B: "shart" (condition). (22) In M: "fala" (then it does not). (23) In B, M: "bi-an" (that).
لا يقْبَلُ إلَّا شهادةَ المَسْئولينَ، ويكلِّفُ اثنَيْنِ منهم أن يَشْهدُوا بالتَّزْكِيَةِ والجَرْح عندَه، على شُروطِ (٢١) الشَّهادةِ فى اللَّفْظِ وغيرِه، ولا تُقْبلُ مِن صاحب المسْألةِ؛ لأنَّ ذلك شهادةٌ على شهادةٍ، مع حضُورِ شُهودِ الأصلِ. ووَجْهُ القولِ الأَوَّل، أنَّ شَهادةَ أصحابِ المسائلِ شهادةُ اسْتِفاضَةٍ؛ لا شهادةٌ على شَهادةٍ، فيُكْتَفَى بمَن يشْهَدُ بها، كسائرِ شهاداتِ الاسْتِفاضةِ؛ ولأنَّه مَوضِعُ حاجةٍ [، فإنَّه لا] (٢٢) يَلزمُ المُزَكِّىَ الحضورُ للتَّزْكِيَةِ، وليس للحاكمِ إجْبارُه عليها، فصارَ كالمرضِ والغَيْبَةِ فى سائرِ الشَّهاداتِ، ولأنَّنا لو لم نَكْتفِ بشهادةِ أصحابِ المسائلِ، لتعذَّرَتِ التَّزْكِيَةُ؛ لأنَّه قد يتَّفِقُ أنْ لا يكونَ فى جيرانِ الشَّاهدِ مَن يَعْرِفُه الحاكمُ، فلا يَقْبَلُ قولَه، فيَفُوتُ التَّعْديلُ والجَرْحُ.
فصل: قال القاضي: ولابُدَّ مِن معرفةِ إسلامِ الشَّاهدِ، ويَحْصُلُ ذلك بأحدِ أربعةِ أُمورٍ؛ أحدُها، إخْبارُه عن نفسِه أنَّه مسلمٌ، أو إتْيانُه بكلمةِ الإسلامِ، وهى شَهادةُ أنْ لا إله إلَّا اللهُ، وأنَّ محمدًا عبدُه ورسولُه؛ لأنَّه لو لم يكنْ مسلمًا صارَ مُسلمًا بذلك. الثانى، اعْترافُ المَشْهودِ عليه بإسْلامِه؛ لأنَّ ذلك حَقٌّ عليه. الثالث، خِبْرةُ الحاكمِ؛ لأنَّنا اكْتفَيْنا بذلك فى عَدالتِه، فكذلك فى إسْلامِه. الرابع، بَيِّنَةٌ تقُومُ به. ولابُدَّ من معرفةِ الحُرِّيَّةِ فى مَوْضِعٍ تُعْتَبَرُ فيه، ويَكْفِى فى ذلك أحدُ أمورٍ ثلاثةٍ؛ بَيِّنَةٌ، أو اعْترَافُ المشْهودِ عليه، أو خِبْرَةُ الحاكمِ. ولا يكْفِى اعْترافُ الشاهدِ؛ لأنَّه لا يَمْلِكُ أن يصيرَ حُرًّا، فلا يَمْلِكُ الإقْرارَ به، بخِلافِ الإسْلامِ.
فصل: وإذا شهِدَ عندَ الحاكمِ مجهولُ الحالِ، فقال المشْهودُ عليه: هو عَدْلٌ. ففيه وَجْهان؛ أحدهما، يَلْزَمُ الحاكمَ الحكمُ بشهادتِه؛ لأنَّ البحثَ عن عَدالتِه لِحَقِّ المشْهودِ عليه، وقد اعْترفَ بها، ولأنَّه إذا أقرَّ بعدالتِه، فقد أقرَّ بما يُوجِبُ الحكمَ لِخَصْمِه عليه، فيُؤْخَذُ بإقرارِه، كسائرِ أقارِيرِه. والثانى، لا يجوزُ الحكْمُ بشهادتِه؛ لأنَّ فى الحُكمِ بها تَعديلًا له، فلا يَثْبتُ بقولٍ واحدٍ، ولأنَّ اعْتبارَ العَدالةِ فى الشاهدِ حَقٌّ للهِ تعالى، ولهذا لو رَضِىَ الخَصْمُ أنْ (٢٣) يُحْكَمَ عليه بقولِ فاسقٍ، لم يَجُزْ الحكمُ به، ولأنَّه لا يَخْلُو؛ إمَّا أن
(٢١) فى ب: "شرط".(٢٢) فى م: "فلا".(٢٣) فى ب، م: "بأن".