just as if he became free through performance [of payment]. As for whether the lesser of the two things is mandatory, or the entire indemnity of the offense? There are two views. The master is entitled to demand from him the indemnity for the offense before the payment of the kitaba wealth, as we have mentioned previously regarding the stranger. If he chooses to delay the indemnity and begin by collecting the kitaba wealth, it is permissible, and he becomes free when he collects all the kitaba wealth. Abu Bakr said: He does not become free by performance [of payment] before the indemnity of the offense because of the necessity of prioritizing it over the kitaba wealth. Our position is that both rights belong to the master, so if they both agree to prioritize one over the other, it is permissible because the right belongs to them both and does not go outside of them; and because if he were to begin with the performance of the kitaba before the indemnity of the offense in the case of a stranger, he would become free, so in the case of the master, it is more fitting. Furthermore, the indemnity of the offense is not required to be paid before the wound has healed, so it is possible for the obligation of performance to precede it. Once this is established, when he performs [the payment], he becomes free, and he is obligated to pay the indemnity of the offense, regardless of whether he has wealth in his possession or not, because his emancipation was due to a cause from his own side, so what was upon him does not drop, unlike the case where his master emancipates him, for he has destroyed the object of his right, whereas here it is the opposite. As for whether he is obligated to pay the lesser of the two things, or the entire indemnity? There are two views. If his offense was against the person of his master, his heirs have the right of retribution in the case of intentional [offense], or pardon for wealth; and in the case of error, there is the wealth. Regarding that with which he ransoms himself, there are two narrations. The ruling of the heirs with the mukatab is the same as the ruling of his master with him, because the kitaba has transferred to them, and if the slave had returned to being an absolute slave, he would have belonged to them. If he commits an offense against the heir of his master, [and his master inherits it], the ruling regarding it is as it would be if the offense were against his master in a matter other than life, as has passed.

Section: If there converge upon the mukatab the indemnity of an offense, the price of a sold item, or compensation for a loan, or other debts along with the kitaba wealth, and he has in his possession what suffices for them, he has the right to