emancipation through fulfillment is achieved, so [restitution within it is not necessary, just as if the contract were valid. Also, because what the master takes is from the earnings of his slave, whose earnings he does not own, so he is not obligated to] return it, and the slave becomes free through the condition, so he is not obligated to pay his value, just as if he had said: "If you enter the house, you are free." As for a corrupt sale, if it is between this [slave] and his master, there is no recourse against the master for what he has taken. If it is between him and someone else, then he has taken what he is not entitled to and has given to the other what he is not entitled to, through a contract whose intent is exchange, and in our issue, it is the opposite. The third [ruling] is that the mukatab (contracted slave) has the right to dispose of his earnings; because the kitaba contract includes permission for that, and he has the right to receive charity and zakat; and because he is a mukatab who becomes free upon fulfillment, so he possesses that, just as in a valid kitaba. The fourth [ruling] is that if he contracts a group in a corrupt kitaba, and one of them fulfills his share, he becomes free, according to the view of one who says that he becomes free in a valid kitaba upon fulfilling his share; because the meaning of the contract is that each one of them is a mukatab according to his share, and whenever he fulfills to him the amount of his share, he is free. And whoever says: He does not become free in a valid one unless he fulfills for everyone, then here it is more appropriate. It differs from the valid one in three rulings: The first is that each of the master and the mukatab has the right to dissolve and rescind it, whether there was a condition there or not. This is the view of the companions of al-Shafiʿi, may Allah have mercy on him; because the corrupt [contract] does not require its ruling, and the condition here is based on exchange and is dependent upon it; because the exchange is the intended purpose, so when the exchange, which is the foundation, is invalidated, the condition based upon it is invalidated, unlike a free-standing condition. Also, because the master did not consent to this condition except by having the named compensation delivered to him, so if it is not delivered, he has the right to invalidate it, unlike a valid kitaba; for the compensation was delivered to him, so the contract was binding upon him. The second is that if the master absolves him of the money, the absolution is not valid, and he does not become free by that; because the money