to carry to the judge of the city where the absent person resides, so he writes to him, or evidence is established against a person present, then he flees before the judgment is issued against him, so the owner of the right asks the judge to issue a judgment against him and to write a letter for him concerning his judgment. In these three scenarios, the judge is obligated to grant his request to write the letter, and the addressee is obligated to accept it, regardless of whether the distance between them is long or short. Even if they are in two parts of the same city or the same session, he is obligated to accept it and enforce it, whether it is a judgment against a person present or an absent person. We are not aware of any disagreement regarding this because the judgment of a judge must be enforced by every judge.

The second type is that he writes to inform him of the testimony of two witnesses before him regarding a right for so-and-so, such as if evidence is established before him regarding a right for a man against another, but he does not issue a judgment on it, and the owner of the right asks him to write a letter for him concerning what has reached him; he shall write for him as well. The judge said: In his letter, it should state: "So-and-so and so-and-so testified before me to such-and-such," so that it is the addressee who issues the verdict based on it. He should not write: "It has been established before me," because his saying "It has been established before me" is a judgment based on their testimony, and this, the addressee would not accept, except in the case of a long distance, which is the distance of Qasr (shortening prayers). He does not accept it for any distance less than that, because it is a transmission of testimony, so it is treated as it is treated in 'Testimony upon Testimony'. This is similar to the opinion of al-Shafi'i. Abu Yusuf and Muhammad said: It is permissible to accept it in his own city. Something similar has been narrated from Abu Hanifah. Some of the later scholars from his school said: What his school necessitates is that it is not permissible, [just as it is not permissible] regarding 'Testimony upon Testimony'. Those who permitted it argued that it is the judge's letter concerning what has been established before him, so its acceptance is permissible even with proximity, like his letter concerning his judgment. As for our stance, it is that this is a transmission of testimony to the addressee, so it is not permissible with proximity, just like 'Testimony upon Testimony', and it is distinct from his letter regarding a judgment; for that is not a transmission, but rather a report. In every situation where the acceptance of the letter is required, he takes the one against whom the judgment was made for the right for which he was judged, so he sends for him and summons him. If he confesses the right, he orders him