When a judge passes judgment on a matter in which Ijtihad (legal reasoning) is permissible, it is not permitted to overturn his ruling, and others are obligated to execute it and act upon it; thus, it becomes equivalent to a judgment based on upright evidence. We do not concede what he mentioned. If he says: "I judged for so-and-so against so-and-so regarding such-and-such," and he does not attribute his judgment to evidence or anything else, it is mandatory to accept it. This is the manifest view in the issue according to al-Khiraqi, for he did not mention what established the judgment; this is because whenever a judge rules on a matter in which Ijtihad is permissible, it is mandatory to accept it, and it becomes equivalent to that which is unanimously agreed upon.
Section: If a judge reports his judgment outside his jurisdiction, the manifest view of al-Khiraqi’s statement is that his word is accepted and his report is effective. This is because if his word regarding his judgment is accepted after his dismissal and the complete cessation of his jurisdiction, then it is even more appropriate that it be accepted while his jurisdiction remains, even if it is outside his place of authority. The Qadi said: His word is not accepted. He said: If two judges meet outside their jurisdictions—such as the judge of Damascus and the judge of Egypt meeting in Jerusalem—and one of them informs the other of a judgment he passed, or testimony that was established before him, neither of them shall accept the other’s word. They would be like two witnesses, one of whom informs the other of what is before him, and he does not have the right to judge by it if he returns to his place of work, because it is the report of someone who is not a judge in that location. If they are both within the jurisdiction of one of them—for instance, if they both meet in Damascus—the judge of Damascus shall not act upon what the judge of Egypt reports to him, because he is reporting it to him outside of his jurisdiction. Whether the judge of Egypt acts upon what the judge of Damascus reports to him when he returns to Egypt involves two views, based on the dispute over whether a judge may rule based on his own knowledge, for there are two narrations regarding this; this is because the judge of Damascus informed him of it within his jurisdiction. The Shafi'i school follows the same position as the Qadi here.
Section: If the Imam appoints a judge and then dies, the judge is not dismissed, because the Caliphs (may Allah be pleased with them) appointed judges during their time, and they were not dismissed upon their deaths. Furthermore, dismissing him upon the death of the Imam would cause harm to the Muslims, as lands would be left without judges, and people's affairs would be suspended until the second Imam appoints a judge, which constitutes a great harm. Likewise, a judge is not dismissed if the Imam is deposed, for the reasons we have mentioned.
(16) In B: "sahibihi" (his companion). (17) Does not appear in: the original. (18) Omitted from: M.