a healthy animal, and it perishes or becomes defective through no negligence of his, he is not liable for more than what was mandatory in his liability; because the excess did not become mandatory in the liability, but rather attached to the specific animal, so it lapsed with its destruction, just as with the original sacrificial animal if it had not become mandatory through designation alone. If he destroys it, or it perishes through his negligence, he is liable for the equivalent of the designated animal; because the right of Allah Almighty attached to the excess, and when he caused it to be lost, he became liable for it, like a sacrificial animal that was designated from the beginning.

Section: The obligation is established by his saying: "This is a sacrificial animal," or by garlanding it (taqlid) and marking it (ish'ar) while intending it as a sacrificial animal. Al-Thawri and Ishaq held this view. It does not become mandatory by mere purchase with intent, nor by mere intent, according to the view of the majority of scholars. Abu Hanifa said: It becomes mandatory by purchase with intent. Our argument is that it is a divestment of property as an act of worship, so it does not become mandatory by intent alone, similar to manumission (itq) and endowment (waqf).

Section: If he usurps a sheep and slaughters it for a mandatory duty, it does not suffice him, whether its owner is pleased or not, or whether he compensates him for it or not. Abu Hanifa said: It suffices him if its owner is pleased. Our argument is that this was not an act of worship in its inception, so it does not become an act of worship in its process, just as if he slaughtered it for food and then intended it to be an act of drawing near [to Allah], or as if he emancipated a slave and then intended it for his expiation.

694 - Issue; he said: (And if he drove it voluntarily, he slaughters it in its place, and leaves it between him and the poor, and neither he nor anyone of his companions eats from it, and there is no replacement for him).

The sum of this is that whoever offers a voluntary sacrificial animal, it does not lack one of two states; one of them is that he intends it as a sacrificial animal, but does not make it mandatory with his tongue, nor by marking it or garlanding it. This does not require him to fulfill it,