the validity of its sale, like an object pledged as security (rahn). Indeed, the right of the offense is more emphatic, because it takes precedence over the right of the pledgee. Our response is that it is a right not firmly established in the offender; he may fulfill it from other than him, so it does not prevent the sale, like Zakat, or it is a right that is established without the consent of his master, so it does not prevent its sale, like a debt owed by him, or it is a matter of disposition concerning the offender, so it is permissible, like emancipation. If the right is retaliation (qisas), then his safety is hoped for and his destruction is feared, so he is like the sick person. As for the pledge, the right is specifically fixed in it; his master does not have the authority to substitute it, as the right was established in it with his consent, as a security for the debt. So, if he invalidates it through sale, the right of security that he undertook by his own consent and choice would be nullified. When this is established, whenever he sells him and the offense warrants property or retaliation (qawad), and it is pardoned in exchange for property, the master must ransom him with the lesser of the two matters: his value or the compensation for his offense. The right is removed from the slave's person upon his sale because the master has the choice between surrendering him or ransoming him. If he sells him, it becomes binding upon him to ransom him, in order to remove the slave from his ownership. The buyer has no option (khiyar), because there is no harm to him, since recourse is had against someone else; this is if the master is solvent. Some of al-Shafi'i's companions said: The master is not obligated to ransom him, because the most that can be said is that he committed to ransom him, so it is not binding on him, just as if the pledgor said, 'I will pay the debt from the pledge.' Our response is that his ownership of the offender has ceased, so it became binding upon him to ransom him, just as if he had killed him, contrary to the case of a pledge. This is the view of Abu Hanifa. If the seller is insolvent, the right of the victim is not dropped from the person of the offender, because the seller only possesses the right to transfer the victim's right from his person by ransoming him or what takes its place, and that does not occur in the liability of an insolvent person, so the right remains in his person as it was, taking precedence over the right of the buyer. The buyer has the option of rescission if he was not aware of the persistence of the right in his person. If he rescinds, he recovers the price, and if he does not rescind, and the offense encompasses the entire value of the slave's person, and he is taken for it, the buyer also recovers the price, because the compensation for such a thing is his entire price. If it does not encompass his entire person, he recovers the amount of its compensation. If he was aware of the defect and was content with the right being attached to him, he does not recover anything, because he bought a defective item while knowing of its defect. If the buyer chooses to ransom him, he may do so, and the sale remains as it is, because he takes the place of the seller in the choice between surrendering him or ransoming him, and his ruling regarding recovering from the seller what he used to ransom him is the ruling of paying a debt on his behalf. If the offense is one that warrants retaliation, the buyer has the choice between returning him and taking