The master is the only one who possesses the right to demand it, and this is a doubt (shubha), and hadd punishments are averted by doubts. Our argument is the report of 'Ali (may Allah be pleased with him), and because he is acknowledging the theft of a specific item that reaches the threshold (nisab), so his amputation is required, just as if a free person acknowledged the theft of an item in the possession of another. What they have mentioned is invalidated by this instance. The item is not returned to the person from whom it was stolen only because of the master's right; however, regarding the right of the slave, it is established for the person to whom the acknowledgment was made. Therefore, if he were to be manumitted and the item returned to his possession, he would be obligated to return it to the person to whom he acknowledged it.
The Fourth Category: Acknowledgment of that which requires qisas (retribution) for life. It is narrated from Ahmad that it is not accepted. The generality of al-Khiraqi's statement—that if a person under interdiction (mahjur 'alayh) acknowledges that which requires a hadd, or qisas, or divorces his wife, he is bound by that—implies the acceptance of his acknowledgment. This is the view of Abu Hanifah, Malik, and al-Shafi'i, because he acknowledged what requires qisas, so it is accepted, just like his acknowledgment of the cutting off of a hand. Also, it is one of the two types of qisas, so his acknowledgment is accepted, like the other. Furthermore, the acknowledgment of his master against him is not accepted for it, so his acknowledgment of it is accepted, like the hadd.
Our scholars argued that the requirement of analogy (qiyas) is that his acknowledgment of qisas should not be accepted at all, because it is an acknowledgment against his master's property, and because he is suspected, as it is possible that there was collusion between them for him to pardon it for money, thus entitling [the victim] to the slave's person (raqabah). That is why the 'aqilah (the paternal relatives responsible for blood money) do not bear the burden of an admission. Thus, we have abandoned the requirement of analogy due to the report of 'Ali (may Allah be pleased with him); therefore, in everything else, it remains subject to the requirement of analogy. Qisas for life differs from qisas for a limb, because it is possible that he intended to escape from his master, even at the cost of his own life. In every instance where we have ruled in favor of accepting his acknowledgment of qisas, the ruling is the same as that established by evidence (bayyinah). Thus, the guardian of the crime has the right to pardon, to exact retribution, or to pardon in exchange for money. If he pardons, the compensation (arsh) attaches to the person (raqabah) of the slave, according to what has been explained previously. It is possible that he does not have the right to pardon in exchange for money, so that this is not used as a means to acknowledge a debt.
وهذه لا يَمْلِكُ غيرُ السَّيِّدِ المُطالَبَةَ بها، ولأنَّ هذا شُبْهَةٌ، والحُدُودُ تُدْرَأُ بالشُّبُهاتِ. ولَنا، خَبَرُ عَلِيٍّ رَضِىَ اللَّه عنه، ولأنَّه مُقِرٌّ بِسَرِقَةِ عَيْنٍ تَبْلُغُ نِصابًا، فوَجَبَ قَطْعُه، كما لو أقَرَّ حُرٌّ بِسَرِقَةِ عَيْنٍ في يَدِ غيرِه، وما ذَكَرُوه يَبْطُلُ بهذه الصُّورَةِ، وإنَّما لم تُرَدَّ العَيْنُ إلى المَسْرُوقِ منه لِحَقِّ السَّيِّدِ، وأمَّا في حَقِّ العَبْدِ، فقد يَثْبُتُ لِلْمُقِرِّ له، ولهذا لو عَتَقَ وعادَتِ العَيْنُ إلى يَدِه، لَزِمَه رَدُّها إلى المُقِرِّ له. القسم الرابع، الإِقْرارُ بما يُوجِبُ القِصاصَ في النَّفْسِ. فرُوِىَ عن أحمدَ، أنَّه لا يُقْبَلُ. وعُمُومُ قولِ الخِرَقِيِّ، إنْ أقَرَّ المَحْجُورُ عليه بما يُوجِبُ حَدًّا، أو قِصاصًا، أو طَلَّقَ زَوْجَتَه، لَزِمَه ذلك. يَقْتَضِى قَبُولَ إقْرارِه، وهو قولُ أبي حنيفةَ، ومالِكٍ، والشَّافِعِيِّ؛ لأنَّه أقَرَّ بما يُوجِبُ قِصاصًا، فَقُبِلَ، كإقْرارِه بِقَطْعِ اليَدِ، ولأنَّه أحَدُ نَوْعَىِ القِصاصِ، فَقُبِلَ إقْرارُه به، كالآخَرِ، ولأنَّه لا يُقْبَلُ إقْرارُ سَيِّدِه عليه به، فَقُبِلَ إقْرارُه به، كالحَدِّ. واحْتَجَّ أصْحابُنا، بأنَّ مُقْتَضَى القِياسِ أن لا يُقْبَلَ إقْرارُه بالقِصاصِ أصْلًا؛ لأنَّه إقْرارٌ على مالِ سَيِّدهِ، ولأنَّه مُتَّهَمٌ، إذ يَحْتَمِلُ أن يكونَ عن مُواطأَةٍ بينهما، لِيَعْفُوَ على مالٍ، فَيَسْتَحِقَّ رَقَبَةَ العَبْدِ، ولذلك لم تَحْمِلِ العاقِلَةُ اعْتِرافًا، فتَرَكْنا مُوجِبَ القِياسِ؛ لِخَبَرِ عَلِىٍّ رَضِىَ اللَّه عنه، ففيما عَداه يَبْقَى على مُوجِبِ القِياسِ. ويُفارِقُ القِصاصُ في النَّفْسِ القِصاصَ في الطَّرَفِ؛ لأنَّه قد يَحْتَمِلُ أنَّه أرادَ التَّخَلُّصَ من سَيِّدهِ، ولو بِفَواتِ نَفْسِه. وكلُّ مَوْضِعٍ حَكَمْنا بِقَبُولِ إقْرارِه بالقِصاصِ، فَحُكْمُه حُكْمُ الثَّابِتِ بالبَيِّنَةِ، فَلِوَلِيِّ الجِنايَةِ العَفْوُ، والاسْتِيفاءُ، والعَفْوُ على مالٍ، فإن عَفَا، تَعَلَّقَ الأَرْشُ بِرَقَبَةِ العَبْدِ، على ما مَرَّ بَيانُه. ويَحْتَمِلُ أن لا يَمْلِكَ العَفْوَ على مالٍ؛ لِئَلَّا يَتَّخِذَ ذلك وَسِيلَةً إلى الإِقْرارِ بمالٍ.
٧٧٠ - مسألة؛ قال: (وَبيْعُ الْكَلْبِ بَاطِلٌ، وإنْ كانَ مُعَلَّمًا)
لا يَخْتَلِفُ المذهبُ في أنَّ بَيْعَ الكَلْبِ باطِلٌ، أىَّ كَلْبٍ كان. وبه قال الحَسَنُ، ورَبِيعَةُ، وحَمَّادٌ، والأوْزاعِيُّ، والشَّافِعِيُّ، وداودُ. وكَرِه أبو هريرةَ ثَمَنَ الكَلْبِ. ورَخَّصَ في ثَمَنِ كَلْبِ الصَّيْدِ خاصَّةً جابِرُ بنُ عبد اللَّه، وعَطاءٌ،