Section: If the pledger acknowledges that the pledge has been taken into possession, or the mortgagee acknowledges taking possession of it, that is accepted in matters where both of them could be truthful. If the pledger acknowledges the taking of possession and then denies it, saying, 'I acknowledged that but I had not actually handed anything over,' or if the mortgagee acknowledges the taking of possession and then denies it, the statement of the one who is the beneficiary of the acknowledgement (the one to whom it was made) is accepted. If the denier requests his oath, there are two views: one is that an oath is not binding upon him, because an acknowledgement is stronger than testimony (bayyinah). If testimony were provided for this and the one against whom it was testified requested his opponent's oath, it would not be accepted from him; therefore, the same applies to acknowledgement. The second view is that the oath is binding upon him, and this is the position of al-Shafi'i in his explicitly stated text, because it is customary for a person to testify against himself regarding possession before it actually occurs, so his claim is heard and his opponent is bound by the oath, for the reason we mentioned regarding the ruling of custom. This is the better view, and it differs from testimony, as testimony does not bear witness to a right before it exists, and if you were to do that, it would not be considered just testimony.
The Qadi said: If the acknowledger is absent and says, 'I acknowledged this because my agent wrote to me about it, then the contrary became clear to me,' we hear his statement and we make his opponent take an oath. If he acknowledges that he handled it himself, then returns and declares his own statement a lie, his opponent shall not be made to take an oath. This is the position of some of the companions of al-Shafi'i. As for if they differ regarding possession, and the mortgagee says, 'I took possession of it,' and the pledger denies it, then the word is with whoever has it in their possession, because if it is in the possession of the pledger, the original state (al-asl) is with him, which is the non-occurrence of the handover, and nothing has been found to indicate the contrary. If it is in the possession of the mortgagee, then possession has been achieved, because it would not be in his possession except after his taking it. If they differ regarding permission, and the pledger says, 'You took it without my permission,' and he says, 'Rather, with your permission,' and it is in the possession of the mortgagee, the word is his (the mortgagee's), because the manifest state (al-zahir) is with him, for the contract has been established and his possession indicates that it is by right. It is also possible that the word is with the pledger, because the original state is the absence of permission, and this is the school of al-Shafi'i. The Qadi mentioned these two views.
Section: If he pledges two items to him and one of them perishes before it is taken into possession, the contract for that one is rescinded, but not for the remaining one, because the contract was valid for both, and the rescission of the contract only occurred for one of them, so it has no effect [on the other], just as if he had bought two things...
(12) In the original: "bi-al-qabd" (with taking possession). (13) In M: "ankara-hu" (denied it).
فصل: وإذا أقَرَّ الرَّاهِنُ بِتَقْبِيضِ الرَّهْنِ، أو أقَرَّ المُرْتَهِنُ بِقَبْضِه، كان ذلك مَقْبُولًا فيما يمكنُ صِدْقُهُما فيه. وإن أقَرَّ الرَّاهِنُ بالتَّقْبِيضِ (١٢)، ثم أنْكَرَ (١٣)، وقال: أقْرَرْتُ بذلك ولم أكن قَبَّضْتُ شيئا. أو أقَرَّ المُرْتَهنُ بالقَبْضِ، ثم أنْكَرَ، فالقولُ قولُ المُقرِّ له، فإن طَلَبَ المُنْكِرُ يَمِينَه، ففيه وَجْهَانِ؛ أحدُهما، لا يَلْزَمُه يَمِينٌ؛ لأنَّ الإقْرَارَ أَقوَى من البَيِّنَةِ، ولو قَامَتِ البَيِّنَةُ بذلك وطَلَبَ المَشْهُودُ عليه يَمِينَ خَصْمِه لم يُقْبَلْ منه، فكذلك الإقْرَارُ. والثاني، يَلْزَمُه اليَمِينُ. وهو قولُ الشَّافِعِيِّ في مَنْصُوصِه؛ لأنَّ العادَةَ جَارِيَةٌ بأنَّ الإنْسَانَ يَشْهَدُ على نَفسِه بالقَبْضِ قبلَه، فَتُسْمَعُ دَعْوَاهُ، ويَلْزَمُ خَصْمَهُ اليَمِينُ، لما ذَكَرْنَا من حُكْمِ العَادَةِ، وهذا أجْوَدُ. ويُفَارِقُ البَيِّنَةَ، فإنَّها لا تَشهَدُ بالحَقِّ قبلَه، ولو فَعَلْتَ ذلك لم تكنْ بَيِّنَةً عَادِلَةً. وقال القاضي: إن كان المُقِرُّ غَائِبًا، فقال: أقْرَرْتُ لأنَّ وَكِيلِى كَتَبَ إلَىَّ بذلك، ثم بَانَ لى خِلَافُه. سَمِعْنَا قَوْلَه، وأحْلَفْنَا خَصْمَهُ. وإن أقَرَّ أنه بَاشَرَ ذلك بِنَفْسِه، ثم عادَ فأكْذَبَ نَفْسَه، لم يُحْلَفْ خَصْمُه. وهذا قولُ بعضِ أصْحَابِ الشَّافِعِيِّ، فأمَّا إن اخْتَلَفَا في القَبْضِ، فقال المُرْتَهِنُ: قَبَّضْتُه. وأنْكَرَ الرَّاهِنُ، فالقولُ قولُ مَن هو في يَدِه؛ لأنَّه إن كان في يَدِ الرَّاهِنِ فالأَصْلُ معه، وهو عَدَمُ الإقْبَاضِ، ولم يُوجَدْ ما يَدُلُّ على خِلَافِهِ، وإن كان في يَدِ المُرْتَهِنِ، فقد وُجِدَ القَبْضُ، لِكَوْنِه لا يَحْصُلُ في يَدِه إلَّا بعد قَبْضِه. وإن اخْتَلَفَا في الإذْنِ، فقال الرَّاهِنُ: أخَذْتَهُ بغير إِذْنِي. قال: بل بإذْنِكَ. وهو في يَدِ المُرْتَهِنِ، فالقولُ قولُه؛ لأنَّ الظَّاهِرَ معه، فإن العَقْدَ قد وُجِدَ، ويَدُهُ تَدُلُّ على أنَّه بِحَقٍّ. ويَحْتَمِلُ أن يكونَ القَوْلُ قولَ الرَّاهِنِ؛ لأنَّ الأصْلَ عَدَمُ الإذْنِ. وهذا مَذْهَبُ الشَّافِعيِّ. ذَكَرَ القاضي هذَيْنِ الوَجْهَيْنِ.
فصل: وإذا رَهَنَهُ عَيْنَيْنِ، فتَلِفَتْ إحْدَاهُما قبلَ قَبْضِها، انْفَسَخَ العَقْدُ فيها دون البَاقِيَةِ، لأنَّ العَقْدَ كان صَحِيحًا فيهما، وإنَّما طَرَأَ انْفِسَاخُ العَقْدِ في إحْدَاهما، فلم
(١٢) في الأصل: "بالقبض".(١٣) في م: "أنكره".