it has no effect, just as if he had bought two things and then returned one of them due to a defect, an option (khiyar), or mutual rescission (iqalah). The pledger has the choice between handing over the remaining item or withholding it. If the destruction occurred after the taking of possession of the other, then the pledge for it has become binding. If the pledge was a condition in a sale, the seller is entitled to the option (khiyar) because of the impossibility of the pledge being complete. If he is satisfied, he does not have the right to demand a replacement for the destroyed item, because the pledge did not become binding upon it, and the item that was taken into possession shall be a pledge for the entire price. If one of the two items was destroyed after the taking of possession, there is no option for the seller, because if the entire pledge had been destroyed, he would have no option; therefore, if a part of it is destroyed, it is more appropriate. Then, if its destruction was after the taking of possession of the other item, the pledge for it is binding. If it was before the taking of possession of the other, the pledger has the choice between handing it over or leaving it. If he refuses to hand it over, the seller is entitled to the option, just as if the other had not been destroyed.
Section: If he pledges a house to him and it collapses before he takes possession of it, the pledge contract is not rescinded because its financial value has not disappeared entirely; its courtyard (arsa) and its ruins (anqad) remain. The mortgagee is entitled to the option if the pledge was a condition in a sale, because it has become defective and its value has decreased. If it is asked: 'Why is the pledge contract not rescinded just as a lease (ijara) is rescinded?' We reply: A lease is a contract on the usufruct of residence, and that has been rendered impossible and non-existent, so the contract is void due to the absence of the subject matter of the contract. The pledge, however, is a contract of security related to the physical objects that possess financial value, and these remain. Based on this, the courtyard and the ruins—such as the wood, stones, and the like—are part of the pledge, because the contract was directed at all the physical parts, and the ruins are part of them, and what entered the contract is firmly established by the taking of possession.
Section: Every item whose sale is permissible, its pledging is also permissible. This is because the intent of the pledge is security for the debt to reach the point of settling it from the price of the pledge if settling it from the liability of the pledger is not possible. This is realized in every item whose sale is permissible. Also, whatever is a valid subject for a sale is a valid subject for the rationale of the pledge, and the subject of a thing is the subject of its rationale, unless a preventer exists to hinder its establishment or a condition is missed, in which case the ruling is negated.
(14) In the original: "fa-radda" (then returned). (15) In M: "li-hikmatihi" (for its rationale).
يُؤَثِّرْ، كما لو اشْتَرَى شَيْئَيْنِ، [ثم رَدَّ] (١٤) أحَدَهُما بِعَيْبٍ أو خِيَارٍ أو إقَالَةٍ، والرَّاهِنُ مُخَيَّرٌ بين إقْبَاضِ البَاقِيَةِ وبين مَنْعِهَا. وإن كان التَّلَفُ بعد قَبْضِ الأُخْرَى، فقد لَزِمَ الرَّهْنُ فيها، فإن كان الرَّهْنُ مَشْرُوطًا في بَيْعٍ ثَبَتَ للبَائِعِ الخِيَارُ؛ لِتَعَذُّرِ الرَّهْنِ بِكَمَالِه، فإن رَضِىَ لم يكُنْ له المُطَالَبَةُ بِبَدَلِ التَّالِفَةِ؛ لأنَّ الرَّهْنَ لم يَلْزَمْ فيها، وتكونُ المَقْبُوضَةُ رَهْنًا بجَمِيعِ الثَّمَنِ. ولو تَلِفَتْ إحْدَى العَيْنَيْنِ بعد القَبْضِ، فلا خِيَارَ للبَائِعِ؛ لأنَّ الرَّهْنَ لو تَلِفَ كلُّه لم يَكُنْ له خِيَارٌ، فإذا تَلِفَ بعضُه أَوْلَى. ثم إن كان تَلَفُها بعدَ قَبْضِ العَيْنِ الأُخْرَى، فقد لَزِمَ الرَّهْنُ فيها، وإن كان قبلَ قَبْضِ الأُخْرَى، فالرَّاهِنُ مُخَيَّرٌ بين إقْبَاضِهَا وبين تَرْكِه، فإن امْتَنَعَ من تَقْبِيضِها، ثَبَتَ للبَائِعِ الخِيَارُ، كما لو لم تَتْلَفِ الأُخْرَى.
فصل: وإن رَهَنَهُ دارًا، فانْهَدَمَتْ قبلَ قَبْضِها، لم يَنْفَسِخْ عَقْدُ الرَّهْنِ؛ لأنَّ مَالِيَّتَهَا لم تَذْهَبْ بالكُلِّيَّةِ، فإنَّ عَرْصَتَها وأنْقَاضَها بَاقِيَةٌ، ويَثْبُتُ لِلْمُرْتَهِنِ الخِيَارُ إن كان الرَّهْنُ مَشْرُوطًا في بَيْعٍ؛ لأنها تَعَيَّبَتْ ونَقَصَتْ قِيمَتُها. فإن قِيلَ: فلِمَ لا يَنْفَسِخُ عَقْدُ الرَّهْنِ كما تَنْفَسِخُ الإجَارَةُ؟ قُلْنَا: الإجَارَةُ عَقْدٌ على مَنْفَعَةِ السُّكْنَى، وقد تَعَذَّرَتْ وعَدِمَتْ، فبَطَلَ العَقْدُ لِعَدَمِ المَعْقُودِ عليه، والرَّهْنُ عقدُ اسْتِيثَاقٍ يَتَعَلَّقُ بالأعْيَانِ التى فيها المَالِيَّةُ، وهى بَاقِيَةٌ. فعلَى هذا تكون العَرْصَةُ والأنْقَاضُ من الأَخْشَابِ والأحْجَارِ ونحوِهما من الرَّهْنِ؛ لأنَّ العَقْدَ وَرَدَ على جَمِيعِ الأعْيَانِ والأَنقَاضُ منها، وما دَخَلَ في العَقْدِ اسْتَقَرَّ بالقَبْضِ.
فصل: وكلُّ عَيْنٍ جازَ بَيْعُها جَازَ رَهْنُها؛ لأنَّ مَقْصُودَ الرَّهْنِ الاسْتِيثاقُ بالدَّيْنِ لِلتَّوَصُّلِ إلى اسْتِيفَائِه من ثَمَنِ الرَّهْنِ إن تَعَذَّرَ اسْتِيفَاؤُه من ذِمَّةِ الرَّاهِنِ، وهذا يَتَحَقَّقُ في كلِّ عَيْنٍ جَازَ بَيْعُها، ولأنَّ ما كان مَحَلًّا لِلْبَيْعِ كان مَحَلًّا لحِكْمةِ الرَّهْنِ، ومَحلُّ الشَّىءِ مَحلُّ حِكْمَتِه (١٥)، إلَّا أن يَمْنَعَ مانِعٌ من ثُبُوتِه، أو يَفُوتَ شَرْطٌ، فَيَنْتَفِىَ
(١٤) في الأصل: "فرد".(١٥) في م: "لحكمته".