warfare, and Abu Bakr chose the view that it is not valid to pledge an offender (jani). This is the school of al-Shafi'i. The basis of the disagreement on this is founded on the disagreement regarding his sale, and the discussion on that has already passed in its place. Furthermore, if the mortgagee was aware of his condition, he has no option, because he entered into it with insight, resembling a buyer when he knows of a defect. If he was not aware, and then learned of it after the apostate has accepted Islam or the offender has been ransomed, it is the same; because the defect has been removed, so it is as if the defect of the sold item was removed. If he learned of it before that, he has the right to reject it and rescind the sale if it was stipulated in a sale contract; because the stipulation required it to be sound, so if it was delivered to him defective, he has the right of rescission, like in a sale. If he chooses to keep it, he has no right to compensation (arsh) or anything else, because if the pledge in its entirety were destroyed before he took possession of it, he would have no right to its substitute, so a part of it is more entitled to this rule. The same applies if he did not know until the slave was killed for apostasy or retaliation (qisas), or was seized for the crime; the mortgagee has no right to compensation. The Qadi mentioned that the analogy of the school is that he has the right to compensation in these instances, by analogy to a sale. This is not the case; for the sold item is a substitute for the price, so if part of it is lost, he regains the portion of the price corresponding to it, and if all of it is lost, such as if the sold item is destroyed before he takes possession, he regains the entire price, whereas the pledge is not a substitute. If it were all destroyed before possession, he would not be entitled to regain anything, so how could he be entitled to regain the substitute for its essence or its partial loss? If the master refuses to ransom the offender, he shall not be compelled to do so, and the slave shall be sold for the crime; because the right of the victim is prioritized over the pledge, so it is similar to if the crime occurred after the pledge. Based on this, if the compensation consumes his value, he is sold and the pledge is void; if it does not consume it, he is sold to the extent of the compensation, and the remainder remains a pledge.
Section: It is valid to pledge a mudabbar (a slave granted post-mortem emancipation), according to the manifest view of the school, based on the permissibility of his sale. Abu Hanifa and al-Shafi'i prohibited it; because he has attached his emancipation to a condition, resembling what if he attached his emancipation to a condition that occurs...
(19) In A: "thabata" (was established). (20) In the original, A: "al-makil" (measured commodity). (21) In M: "ghaybihi" (his essence/absence). The dots are unclear in the original, A. What we have established is likely the correct reading. (22) In M: "bi-al-arsh" (for the compensation).
الْمحَارَبَةِ، واختَارَ أبو بكرٍ أنَّه لا يَصِحُّ رَهْنُ الجانِى. وهو مَذْهَبُ الشَّافِعِيِّ. ومَبْنَى الخِلَافِ في هذا على الخِلَافِ في بَيْعِه، وقد سَبَقَ الكَلَامُ فيه في مَوْضِعِه. ثم إن كان المُرْتَهِنُ عَالِمًا بحَالِه، فلا خِيَارَ له؛ لأنَّه دَخَلَ على بَصِيرَةٍ، فأشْبَه المُشْتَرِىَ إذا عَلِمَ العَيْبَ، وإن لم يكُنْ عَالِمًا، ثم عَلِمَ بعد إسْلَامِ المُرْتَدِّ وفِدَاءِ الجانِى، فكذلك؛ لأنَّ العَيْبَ زَالَ، فهو كما لو زَالَ عَيْبُ المَبِيعِ. وإن عَلِمَ قبلَ ذلك، فله رَدُّه وفَسْخُ البَيْعِ إن كان مَشْرُوطًا في عَقْدِ بَيْعٍ؛ لأنَّ الشَّرْطَ اقْتَضَاهُ سَلِيمًا، فإذا سُلِّمَ إليه مَعِيبًا، مَلَكَ الفَسْخَ، كالبَيْعِ، وإن اخْتَارَ إمْسَاكَه، فليس له أرْشٌ ولا شىءٌ؛ لأنَّ الرَّهْنَ بجُمْلَتِه لو تَلِفَ (١٩) قبلَ قَبْضِه، لم يَمْلِكْ بَدَلَه، فبعضُه أَوْلَى. وكذلك لو لم يَعْلَمْ حتى قُتِلَ العَبْدُ بالرِّدَّةِ أو القِصَاصِ، أو أُخِذَ في الجِنَايَةِ، فلا أَرْشَ لِلْمُرْتَهِنِ. وذَكَرَ القاضي أنَّ قِيَاسَ المَذْهَبِ أنَّ له الأرْشَ في هذه المَوَاضِع، قِيَاسًا على البَيْعِ. وليس الأمرُ كذلكَ؛ فإنَّ المَبِيعَ عِوَضٌ عن الثَّمَنِ، فإذا فَاتَ بعضُه، رَجَعَ بما يُقَابِلهُ من الثَّمَنِ، ولو فَاتَ كله، مثلَ أن يَتْلَفَ المَبِيعُ (٢٠) قبلَ قَبْضِه، رَجَعَ بالثَّمَنِ كلِّه، والرَّهْنُ ليس بِعِوَضٍ. ولو تَلِفَ كلُّه قبلَ القَبْضِ، لما اسْتَحَقَّ الرُّجُوعَ بشىءٍ، فكيف يَسْتَحِقُّ الرُّجُوعَ بِبَدَل عَيْنِه (٢١) أو فَواتِ بَعْضِه؟ وإن امْتَنَعَ السَّيِّدُ من فِدَاءِ الجانِى، لم يُجْبَرْ، ويُبَاعُ في الجِنَايَةِ؛ لأنَّ حَقَّ المَجْنِى عليه مُقَدَّمٌ على الرَّهْنِ، فأشْبَهَ ما لو حَدَثَتِ الجِنَايَةُ بعد الرَّهْنِ. فعلَى هذا إن اسْتَغْرَقَ الأرْشُ (٢٢) قِيمَتَه، بِيعَ وبَطَلَ الرَّهْنُ، وإن لم يَسْتَغْرِقْها، بِيعَ منه بِقَدْرِ الأرْشِ، والباقِى رَهْنٌ.
فصل: ويَصِحُّ رَهْنُ المُدَبَّرِ، في ظَاهِرِ المَذْهَبِ، بِنَاءً على جَوَازِ بَيْعِه. ومَنَعَ منه أبو حنيفةَ والشَّافِعِيُّ؛ لأنَّه عَلَّقَ عِتْقَهُ بِصِفَةٍ، أشْبَه ما لو عَلَّق عِتْقَهُ بِصِفَةٍ تُوجَدُ
(١٩) في أ: "ثبت".(٢٠) في الأصل، أ: "المكيل".(٢١) في م: "غيبه". والنقط غير واضح في الأصل، أ. ولعل ما أثبتناه الصواب.(٢٢) فى م: "بالأرش".