it returns as owned by virtue of the initial ownership, and thus the ruling of the pledge also returns; for it ceased with the cessation of ownership, so it returns with its return. This is the school of al-Shafi'i. Malik and Abu Hanifah said: It remains a pledge in its current state; because it had a value while it was grape juice, and it is possible that it will have value, so ownership does not cease regarding it, just as if the one who committed the crime were to apostatize. Furthermore, the possession (yad) did not cease regarding it in terms of legal ruling. This is why if a usurper usurped it and it turned to vinegar while in his possession, it would be the property of the one from whom it was usurped. If his possession had ceased, it would be the property of the usurper, just as if he poured it out and someone collected it, and it turned to vinegar while in his possession; it would belong to him, not to the one who poured it out. This position is identical in meaning to our first position, except that they argue for the continuation of the binding nature of the contract even while it is wine. The benefit of the disagreement did not become clear to me after they agreed upon its return as a pledge upon its transformation into vinegar, and I consider the opinion that it remains a pledge closer to correctness; because if the contract were voided, it would not return as valid without initiating a new contract. If they say: It is possible for it to return validly due to the return of the meaning that was voided by its disappearance, just as the wife of a disbeliever, if she converts to Islam, she leaves the ruling of the contract due to the difference in their religion, but if the husband converts during the waiting period (idda), the marriage returns via the first contract due to the removal of the difference in religion. We reply: In that case, the marriage did not cease, nor was the contract voided. If it had been voided by the expiration of the waiting period, it would not have returned except via a new contract. Rather, the contract was suspended and kept under consideration; so if they both convert during the waiting period, we determine that it was not voided, and if he does not convert, we determine that it had been voided. Here, however, you have definitively concluded its voidance.

Section: Is it valid to pledge fruit before its ripeness becomes apparent, without the condition of cutting it, or green crops? There are two points of view regarding this. One is that it is permissible. This is the choice of the Qadi, because the uncertainty (gharar) is reduced in it; for whenever the fruit is ruined, he returns to his right [which is] in the liability (dhimmah) of the pledgor. Also, because it is permissible to sell it, it is permissible to pledge it, and when the right becomes due, it is sold; if the mortgagee chooses to delay its sale, he may do so. The second [view] is that it is not valid. This is the explicit statement of al-Shafi'i, because it is not permissible to sell it, so it is not valid to pledge it, like everything else that is not permissible to sell. The Qadi mentioned that it is permissible to pledge an item sold which is required to be taken into possession,