It is not considered taken into possession thereby, because taking into possession is an integral part of the contract, and thus it attaches to one of the contracting parties, just like the offer and acceptance. Our argument is that it is a taking into possession within a contract, therefore, it is permissible to appoint an agent for it, like all other instances of taking into possession. It is distinct from acceptance, because if an offer is directed to a person, the acceptance must be from him, as he is the one addressed by it. If one appoints an agent for the offer and acceptance before the offer is made to him, that is also valid. Furthermore, what they have cited is invalidated by the taking into possession in a sale, regarding matters where taking into possession is considered. Once this is established, it is permissible for the two parties to the pledge to place the pledge in the hands of whoever is permitted to be appointed as an agent, provided he is a person of legal capacity, whether he is a Muslim or an infidel, just or corrupt, male or female. It is not permissible for him to be a minor, because he lacks legal capacity entirely; if they do so, [his taking into possession] and lack of possession are the same. Nor can it be a slave without his master's permission, because the slave's services belong to his master, so it is not permissible to waste them in custody without his permission. If the master grants him permission, it is permissible. As for the Mukatab (a slave in a contract of manumission), if he receives a fee, it is permissible, because he has the right to earn and to offer his services without the master's permission. If it is without a fee, it is not permissible, because he does not have the right to gratuitously offer his services.

Section: If they place the pledge in the hands of two just persons, it is permissible, and they both must hold it; it is not permissible for one of them to have sole custody of it. If one of them hands it over to the other, he is liable for half, because that is the portion in which he exceeded his authority. This is one of the two views held by the companions of al-Shafi'i. In the other view, if one of them is satisfied with the other holding it, it is permissible. This is also the position of Abu Yusuf and Muhammad. Abu Hanifah said: If it is something that can be divided, they divide it; otherwise, each of them may hold all of it, because their joint holding of it is difficult for them, so the matter is construed as each of them having the authority to hold it. Our argument is that the two parties to the pledge were only satisfied with both of them holding it together, so it is not permissible for one of them to do so alone, just like two executors, neither of whom may act alone in the disposal. Their claim that joint holding is difficult is not so, for it is possible to place it in a storehouse where each of them has a key.