Similarly, if the pledgor dies after the authorization, the agency is annulled. The analogy of the school is that whenever he dismisses him from the sale, the pledgee has the right to rescind the sale which resulted in the pledge being given as its price, just as if the pledgor refused to surrender the pledge stipulated in the sale. As for if the pledgee dismisses him, he is not dismissed, because the neutral party is the agent of the pledgor, since the pledge is his property. Even if he were to act alone in appointing him, it would be valid; thus, he is not dismissed by the dismissal of another. However, he may not sell it without his (the pledgee's) permission. Likewise, if they did not dismiss him and the debt became due, he should not sell it until he seeks the permission of the pledgee, because the sale is for his right, so it is not permissible until he authorizes it. He does not need a renewal of permission from the pledgor, according to the apparent statement of Ahmad, because the authorization has already been established once, so it suffices, as is the case with agency in all other rights. Al-Qadi mentioned another view: that he requires a renewal of permission because he (the pledgor) might have an interest in paying the debt from elsewhere. The first view is more appropriate, for the authorization is sufficient as long as it has not been altered, and the interest is not given consideration in the face of an explicit authorization to the contrary, as evidenced by when he renews the authorization for him. This is contrary to the pledgee, for the sold item requires his demanding the debt. The school of al-Shafi'i has a view similar to this.

Section: If an outsider destroys the pledge in the hands of the neutral party, the perpetrator is liable for its value, which becomes a pledge in his (the neutral party's) hand, and he has the right to demand it, because it is the substitute for the pledge and stands in its place, and he has the right to hold the pledge and safeguard it. If the two parties to the pledge authorized him to sell the pledge, al-Qadi said: The analogy of the school is that he has the right to sell its value, because he has the right to sell the growth of the pledge as a dependent of the original, so the value is more entitled to this. The companions of al-Shafi'i said: He does not have that right, because he is a disposer by virtue of authorization, so he does not possess the right to sell what he was not authorized to sell, and that which was authorized for sale has perished, and its value is something else. Al-Qadi may respond: He has been authorized to sell the pledge, and the value is a pledge; the ruling of the original is established for it, in terms of his having the right to demand it, hold it, and satisfy his debt from its price, and therefore, so is its sale. If the value is of the same genus as the debt, and he has been authorized to satisfy it from the price of the pledge, he possesses the right to satisfy it from the value.