at the time of the contract, or before it became binding, the ruling for both is the same, and this does not prevent the validity of the contract; because the origin is the absence of pregnancy. If she appears to be non-pregnant, or pregnant with a child who cannot be attributed to the pledger, the pledge remains as it is. Similarly, if it could be attributed to him, but she does not become an umm al-walad (mother of a child) through it, such as if he had intercourse with her while she was his wife, then he came to own her and pledged her. If she appears to be pregnant with a child through whom she becomes an umm al-walad, the pledge is voided, and the mortgagee has no choice [to rescind], even if it was stipulated in a sale; because he entered into it knowing that she would not be a pledge. Thus, if she exits the pledge for that reason which he knew, he has no choice, just like the sick person if he dies, or the offender if retaliation is taken against him. This is the view of the majority of the Shafi'i scholars. Some of them said: He has the choice, because the intercourse itself does not establish the choice, so his consent to it was not consent to the pregnancy that results from it, unlike injury and illness. Our position is that his permission for the intercourse is permission for what it leads to; likewise, his consent to it is consent to what it leads to. Regarding the third state: He confesses to the intercourse after the pledge has become binding. It is accepted regarding his own rights, but not accepted regarding the rights of the mortgagee; because he has confessed to something that annuls a binding contract for someone else, so it is not accepted, just as if he had confessed [to something] after selling it. It is possible that it might be accepted, because he confessed concerning his own property to something where there is no suspicion, as he is harmed by that more than he benefits from her exiting the pledge. The first is more correct; because a person’s confession regarding others is not accepted. This is the ruling if he confesses that he usurped her, or that she had committed an offense for which the compensation for injury (arsh) was attached to her person. There are two opinions from al-Shafi'i regarding this. If he confesses that he freed her, his confession is valid, and she exits the pledge. This is what Abu Hanifa said. Al-Shafi'i said in one of his two opinions: It is not accepted, based on the principle that his freeing of a pledge is not valid. Our position is that if he were to free it, his manumission would take effect, so his confession to having freed it is accepted, just as with something other than a pledge. Also, because his confession to having freed it serves the same function as his act of freeing it, so it is like saying: "You are free." It may be inferred that the confession of an insolvent person does not take effect, based on the principle that his manumission does not take effect. In every instance where we said: "The word is with the pledger," the judge said: That is with his oath; because his lying is possible. It is also possible that he is not made to take an oath.