Muslims, and who is mixed among them from the people of knowledge, his claim is not accepted; because he is not without someone from whom he could hear [knowledge] by which he would know the prohibition of that, so he is like one who does not claim ignorance. His child is a slave to the pledger, because it is from adultery. There is no difference in all that we have mentioned between whether the intercourse is with the permission of the pledger or without his permission. This is what is explicitly stated by al-Shafi'i. It is possible that the value of the child is not incumbent if there was permission for the intercourse; this is the view of some of the followers of al-Shafi'i, because permission for intercourse is permission for what ensues from it, evidenced by the fact that if the mortgagee permits the pledger to have intercourse, and she becomes pregnant by him, his right in the pledge lapses. And if he gives permission for cutting off a finger, and it spreads to another, he is not liable for it. The reasoning of the first view is that the obligation of compensation prevents the child from being created as a slave, and its cause is the belief in lawfulness, and that did not occur with his permission, unlike the intercourse, for her exiting the pledge by means of the pregnancy is something the permitted intercourse is a cause for. As for the dower (mahr), if the intercourse is with the permission of the pledger, there is no dower for her. Abu Hanifa said: It is incumbent for her, because it is incumbent for her primarily, and it is not nullified by the permission of other than her. Regarding the Shafi'is, there are two doctrines similar to this. Our argument is that he permitted its cause, which is his right, so it is not incumbent, just as if he had permitted killing her. Furthermore, the owner permitted the fulfillment of the usufruct, so its compensation is not incumbent, like a free woman who complies. If it was without permission, then the dower is incumbent, whether he forced her or she complied. Al-Shafi'i said: The dower is not incumbent with compliance, because the Prophet (peace be upon him) forbade the dower of a prostitute. And because when the hadd is incumbent upon the woman with whom intercourse took place, the dower is not incumbent, like a free woman. Our argument is that the dower is incumbent for the master, so it is not nullified by the compliance and permission of the slave girl, just as if she had permitted the cutting of her hand. Furthermore, he fulfilled this usufruct owned by the master without his permission, so its compensation is upon him, just as if he had forced her, and like the indemnity for her virginity if she were a virgin. The hadith is specific to a woman forced into prostitution; for God Almighty named her such, despite her being forced into it, as He said: "And do not force your slave girls to prostitution if they desire chastity." Regarding their saying: "Neither the hadd nor the dower is incumbent," we say: The dower is not incumbent for her, and in our issue, it is not incumbent for her, rather it is incumbent for her master. It differs from the free woman, for if the dower were to be incumbent, it would be for her, and she has relinquished her right by her permission. Here, the one entitled [to the right] did not permit it. Furthermore, the obligation in the case of a free woman occurs [based on] forcing her, and its falling away is due to her compliance. Likewise, the master here, once the falling away became attached to his permission, it should be established upon its absence. It is the same whether he had intercourse with her believing it lawful, or not believing it lawful, or claimed a doubt, or did not claim it; because the dower is a right of a human being, so it is not nullified by doubts. This slave girl does not become an 'umm walad' (mother of a child) to the mortgagee under any circumstances, whether he owned her after the delivery or before it, and whether we ruled [that the child is a slave] or free, because he impregnated her while she was not in his ownership.

Section: He said: "And when the pledged slave commits an offense, the victim of the offense has a better right to his person than the mortgagee, until he has fulfilled his right. If his master chooses to ransom him and does so, he remains a pledge as he was."

In summary, when a pledged slave commits an offense against a person or their property, the offense attaches to his person, and thus it is prioritized over the right of the mortgagee. We know of no disagreement regarding this; this is because the offense is prioritized over the right of the owner, and ownership is stronger than a pledge, so it is more fitting that it be prioritized over the pledge. If it is said: But the right of the mortgagee is also prioritized over the right of the owner. We say: The right of the mortgagee was established from the side of the owner by his contract, and the right of the offense was established without his choice, prioritized over his right, so it is prioritized over [the pledge].