If the indemnity does not exhaust his value, we sell from him the amount of the indemnity for the offense, which becomes a pledge with the mortgagee of the victim, while the remainder remains with his own mortgagee. If it is not possible to sell a portion of him, he is sold in his entirety, and his price is divided between them according to that, which becomes a pledge. If the offense exhausts his value, the offender is transferred and made a pledge with the other. It is also possible that he may be sold, due to the probability that a bidder might desire him for more than his price, so that there would remain from his value something that would be a pledge with his own mortgagee. This is the entire position of al-Shafi'i.

Section: If the offense is against the master's heir regarding something other than the person, such as his limbs or his property, it is like an offense against a stranger, and he has the right of retaliation if it is warranted, and the right to pardon in exchange for property belonging to someone else. If it is warranted by property initially, it is established. If that transfers to the master upon the death of the entitled person, he has whatever his predecessor had of the right to retaliation and the right to pardon in exchange for property; because persistence is stronger than origination, so it is permissible for that to be established by it, which is not established by origination. If the offense is against his person by killing, the ruling is established for his master, and he has the right to exact retaliation where it is warranted. If he pardons in exchange for property, or the offense warranted property initially, is it established for the master? There are two views: one of them is that it is established. This is the position of some of al-Shafi'i's companions because the offense is against someone else, so it is like an offense against something other than the person. The second is that his property is not established in his slave, nor does he have the right to pardon in exchange for it. This is the position of Abu Thawr, because it is a right that was established for the master initially, so he does not have that, just as if the offense were against him. The foundation of these two views is whether the obligation of the right at its inception is established for the deceased and then transfers to his heir, or is it established for the heir initially? There are two views. And in every situation where property is established for him in the person of his slave, it is prioritized over the pledge, because it is established for the predecessor in such a manner, so it transfers to his heir in the same manner. If he exacts retaliation