the sale. As for the condition that the sold object itself be pledged for its price, it is not valid for several reasons: among them is that it is not owned by him. Another is that the sale necessitates the fulfillment of the price from something other than the sold object, whereas a pledge necessitates fulfillment from it. Another is that the sale necessitates the delivery of the sold object first, while pledging the sold object necessitates that he not deliver it until he receives the price. Another is that the sale necessitates that holding onto the sold object be guaranteed, while a pledge necessitates that it not be guaranteed, and this causes a contradiction in their rulings. The apparent meaning of the narration is the validity of its pledge. As for their statement that it is not owned [at that moment], we reply: He only stipulated its pledge after he owned it. As for their statement that the sale necessitates the fulfillment of the price from something other than the sold object, this is incorrect; it only necessitates the fulfillment of the price in general, and if the fulfillment of the price from something other than the sold object were to become impossible, he would fulfill it from its price. As for their statement that the sale necessitates the delivery of the sold object before the delivery of the price, this is refuted. Even if it were granted, it does not prevent one from establishing the contrary through a condition, just as the requirement of a sale is the immediate maturity of the price and the obligation of its delivery at that moment, yet if they stipulate a deferment, it is permissible. Likewise, the requirement of a sale is the establishment of ownership in the sold object and the authorization to dispose of it, yet this is negated by the condition of an option (khiyar), and this is the answer to the third and fourth points. However, if he did not stipulate this in the sale but rather he pledged it with him after the sale, then if it was after the sale became binding, the preferred view is its validity; because it is valid for him to pledge it with someone else, so it is valid with him just like anyone else, and because it is valid for him to pledge it for something other than its price, so it is valid to pledge it for its price. If it was before the sale became binding, it depends on the permissibility of disposing of the sold object; so in every case where it is permissible to dispose of it, it is permissible to pledge it, and where it is not, it is not; for it is a type of disposal, so it resembles selling it.