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Al-Mughni by Ibn Qudama - Edited by Al-Turki
Volume 6 · Page 505Section

Translation · EN

Section: If one stipulates in the sale a corrupt (fasid) condition, such as [a pledge of something] prohibited, unknown, non-existent, that which he is unable to deliver, or something unspecified, or if he stipulates the pledging of the sold object for its price, there are two narrations regarding the corruption of the sale, the reasoning for which has already passed under the section on corrupt conditions in sales. Abu al-Khattab chose in this instance the corruption of the sale, and this is the opinion of Abu Hanifa and one of the two opinions of al-Shafi'i, and that mention has already passed.

Section: Conditions in a pledge (rahn) are divided into two categories: valid and corrupt. The valid ones are like stipulating that it be in the hands of a specified trustworthy person (adl), or two such persons, or more, or that the trustworthy person sells it upon the maturity of the right. We know of no disagreement regarding the validity of this. If he stipulates that the pledge-taker (murtahin) sell it, it is valid. This is also the view of Abu Hanifa and Malik. Al-Shafi'i said: It is not valid, because it is an agency (tawkil) in a matter where two objectives conflict, so it is not valid, just as if he appointed him as an agent to sell it to himself. The aspect of conflict is that the pledger (rahin) desires to wait regarding the sold object and be cautious in ensuring the price is fulfilled, whereas the pledge-taker desires to hasten the right and finalize the sale. Our argument is that whatever it is permissible to appoint someone other than the pledge-taker as an agent for, it is permissible to appoint the pledge-taker for, such as selling another object. Furthermore, whoever is permitted to have the holding [of the pledge] stipulated for him, it is permitted to stipulate the sale for him, just like the trustworthy person. The difference between the two objectives does not cause harm if the objective of the pledge-taker is something he is entitled to, namely, the fulfillment of the price upon the maturity of the right and the finalization of the sale. Moreover, since the pledger has appointed him as an agent while knowing his objective, he has permitted him to do so, and the right belongs to him, so he is not prevented from permitting it, just as if he appointed a dissolute person (fasiq) to sell his wealth and collect its price. We do not concede that it is not permissible to appoint him as an agent to sell something to himself, and even if we were to concede it, it is because in that case a single person would be both seller and buyer, offerer and acceptor, and the one taking possession from himself for himself, which is different from our issue.

Section: If he pledges a slave-girl to him and stipulates that she be with a woman, or one of her unmarriageable kin (mahram), or that she be in the possession of the pledge-taker or a third party in a manner that does not lead to seclusion (khalwa) with her—such as, for instance, if both of them have wives, concubines, or women from their unmarriageable kin present with them in their house—it is permissible, because it does not lead to a prohibited act. If that is not the case, the condition is corrupt because it leads to prohibited seclusion, and she is not safe from harm. However, the pledge does not become corrupt, because it does not return to [a state of] deficiency or harm regarding the rights of the contracting parties. The ruling in this case is the same as if he had pledged her without a condition: the pledge is valid, and the judge shall place her in the hands of someone with whom it is permissible for her to be. If the pledge is a male slave and he stipulates his location, it is permissible; if he does not stipulate his location, it is also valid, just like the slave-girl. It is possible [to argue] that it is not valid, because the slave-girl has a custom [of seclusion], unlike the male slave. The first view is more correct, for if the pledge-taker of a slave-girl is someone who it is permissible for her to be left with, it is like the male slave. And if the pledge-taker of a male slave is a woman who has no husband, and she stipulates that he be with her in a manner that leads to her seclusion with him, it is also not permissible, so they are the same.

Notes

(19) In Al-Asl: "conflicts (yunaafi)".

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